The Horseback Sapper

Introduction

Having now arrived and settled into Mons, it has been a case of get out and look at the Great War History on my doorstep and it is pretty much on my door step.

There is a lot about the first and last shots of the war, and also the defence of the Canal and all of the actions that come with that – From a Sapper point of view the winning of 2 VCs for the actions on the 23 Aug is a big deal. But there is more to this, a lot more in fact and it also involves the Mounted Sappers of the Field Sqn RE.

Depending on what book you look at or who you talk to there are between 18-22 “bridges” across the canals that formed the BEF line of defence on the 23-24 Aug 1914.

Why the difference in numbers?

The canal had road bridges, rail bridges, foot bridges, locks, locks with bridges and some double bridges (bridges over the canal and directly linked a second bridge over a smaller drainage canal/ channel on the south side). With reference the locks not all were classed as a crossing -even though it would be possible for men on foot to cross. So you can see that there is a whole range of Structures that cross the Canals and offer a means of access from one side to the other.

I will look at what happened to them and who had responsibilities for them. I’ll go through the actions at the bridges moving East to west as that generally matches the the actions with the enemy as they approached the canal line.

Points to note

One of the points that is clear from reading the accounts, the war diaries and also some of the reference books is that there is not enough explosives held by the Sapper Field units for the task at hand, that becomes very clear as soon as the various units see the task at hand.

• A Field Company RE would have 560 Slabs of wet Gun Cotton (1 lb each) and 720 primers (1 oz dry gun cotton packages)
• The Field Sqn RE would be better provided for with 1120 Slabs of wet Gun Cotton (1 lb each) and 1920 primers (1 oz dry gun cotton packages),

It is also noted that while the Officers and Sappers of the units know demolitions and have been trained in it, they are not well practised in it. This is pointed out by Lt Gen Buckland in his 1932 article for the RE Journal and Capt EW Cox RE’s lecture to the Senior Officers Course at the SME, Chatham and recorded in the RE Journal Sep 1913. Cox points out that during the pre war exercises of 1911 the Field Troops are well practised in Water Supply and River Crossings, the demolition tasks tended to be cutting railway lines rather than bridge demolitions but are not close to be experts n the task.

Cox also pointed out that the quantity of explosives held by the Field Troops was too little and that there was no first line resupply – it would be interesting to know if his recommendation of a 100% resupply of demolition stores be carried with the Artillery Battery ammunition supply in each Brigade was ever taken up.

Another thing to note is that the view of the French Commander, General Joffre, was that this was going to be an “offensive” operation and as such no demolition plan was developed by either the British or the French in the event that they may have to withdraw, this failing cause a lot of problems for the BEF as it retreated from Mons back into France.

The last point to note is that in Horsfall & Cave’s book “Mons 1914” they state that just prior to the outbreak of war that a fault is identified with the in-service Instantaneous Fuse and it is withdrawn from service and only limited replacements items were available. As such the RE Field units had to rely on the Electric Exploder equipment of which there was only one per Field Section (remember this is a 40 man troop in modern parlance) and per Field Troop, and Safety Fuse. I have to state none of the other references mention this, I had hoped that the RE History Volume 5 may mention it but it doesn’t, but bearing in mind it was written in 1953 from war diaries, notes and memories, it doesn’t surprise me, but to support this every reference talks about the exploder and safety fuse and no mention of instantaneous fuse. it’s not mentioned in the war diaries as the equipment recall occurred just prior to the declaration of war, which is the marker for the start of unit war diaries.

3 Division’s Area – Obourg, Nimy, Jemappes and Mariette.

The Canal area that covered Mons (the Eastern and Northern side)was covered by units of 3 Div, this was also the responsibility of the 2 Field Companys Royal Engineers of that Division:

• 56 Field Company Royal Engineers

• 57 Field Company Royal Engineers.

56 Field Company RE covered the Eastern Crossings from Obourg round to Nimy. When given the task the OC of 56 Fld Coy RE he carried out a recce of the crossings and quickly identified that he did not have nearly enough explosives to deal with the types of crossing points. He dispatched men into Mons to try and get more explosives either from Military or civilian sources. He was also told that he was not to start any demolition work until 0630hrs on the 23 Aug 14.

Unfortunately by the time that 56 Field Company sappers move upto the crossings and bridges the Germans were already pressing down on the 3 crossings in the Obourg area.

*A Personal Take – while it could be said that the crossings could have been prepared with the unit holdings of explosives there were a number of factors that should be considered.

All of the crossings are substantial items of engineering and would need a significant quantity of explosives.

The limited availability of Fuse Instantaneous and the numbers of electrical exploders made the task difficult.

The time at which 56^th Fld Coy were tasked was late and the Germans were already pressing down so that the demolitions would need to be “hasty” demolition tasks rather than “deliberate” and as such they would require significantly more explosives to achieve the required effect. (According to the Field engineering manual 1911, hasty demolitions should add a factor of 50% onto all calculated explosives)

The crossings that 56 Fld Coy RE had to deal with in the 4^th Middlesex area were:

• Lock No 4

• Road Bridge to Obourg, next to the Railway station.

• Lock No 5

In some cases the locks on the Canal do have a bridges incorporated, but for some they do not but can still provide a crossing point for infantry when they are in the closed position.

Due to the weight of fire from the Germans on the eastern bank and the high ground it was not possible to prepare any these crossings for demolition and all of the crossings were captured intact.

Moving up into the 9th Brigade area at Nimy there were a further 4 crossing points that were also the responsibility of 56 Fld Coy RE.

• The Bridge on the Rue Des Bragnons. This Connected the villages of Nimy and Maisieres. This was a lifting bridge with the lifting gear on the Maisieres side (Northern Bank/Enemy side).

• Swing Road Bridge at Nimy

• Nimy Railway Bridge. This was a metal construction bridge.

Lt Holt RE and his Section (a Troop in modern parlance) were attempting to install demolitions onto the Rue Des Bragnons Bridge when the Germans rushed the bridge. Lt Holt was shot and injured and his section was captured. Lt Holt soon died of his wounds and has the unfortunate claim to fame of being the first Royal Engineer to be killed in the Great War.

The next 2 bridges (The Swing Bridge and the Railway Bridge) were the responsibility of Lt AF Day RE and his section. Lt Day did not have enough explosive to destroy both bridges. The swing bridge had been rotated open and secured on the South Bank (Nimy) and the metal railway bridge was being defended by Machine Guns of the 4^th Royal Fusiliers.

Both bridges were under heavy enemy fire and Lt Day took cover with the hope that the opportunity may present itself to allow him and his sappers to get onto the railway bridge to install the demolition charges. Unfortunately there were no opportunities and Lt Day was wounded and soon after was captured once the Germans crossed the bridges.

The Germans captured both of these bridges intact.

The last of the crossing points in the 56 Fld Coy RE area was Lock No 6, having read several accounts there is no suggestion that this lock had any form of bridge, so the assumption is that this was just a lock and would have been simply opened with the mechanism either locked or damaged to prevent closing.

The next series of crossings were allocated to 57 Fld Coy RE.

• The Ghlin Road bridge (1000 yards west of lock No 6)
• Railway Bridge (500 yards west of the Ghlin Bridge)

Both of these bridges were the responsibility of Cpl A Payne and 6 sappers. On both of the bridges charges were laid but due to not having an electric exploder they would both require to be initiated using Safety Fuse. This created its own particular challenge as it required the bridges to be initiated with equal lengths of safety fuse. Despite this challenge Cpl Payne and his sappers successfully destroyed both bridges. (Note- the reason why the safety fuse needed to be of an equal length is that if one side detonates before the other side there is a chance that the blast would shift or blow the other charges off the structure before they detonated, the result would mean a partial demolition)

Moving on into the next battalion area – 1^st Royal Scots Fusiliers, this is the start of the Conde Canal and the Battalion had a 2000 yard frontage of canal to defend. This was still 57 Fld Coy RE area of responsibility.

The Crossings are:

• Lock No 1
• Lifting Road Bridge at the Gas Poste
• Lock No 2, this has a bridge crossing as part of it’s construction.
• Lifting Road Bridge at Jemappes

Lock No 1 had no bridge and as such it was opened and fixed in position.

the Gas Poste lifting road bridge was prepared for dems by Lt Boulnois RE and Sgt Smith and successfully blown using the Section’s Electric exploder. With this bridge destroyed, Lt Boulnois and Sgt Smith dashed onto deal with the other bridges.

Lock No2 was being dealt with by LCpl Jarvis and his sappers and some of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, at this time they were under fire and Cpl Jarvis ordered his men to get back while he finished fixing the charges, working from a row boat he was assisted by Private Heron of the RSF. Despite the enemy fire the charges were set and Jarvis completed the demolition. For this action under fire he was awarded the Victoria cross and Heron was awarded the DCM.

while this was going on the 3 Div CRE’s adjutant – Capt Wright RE was helping the sappers by moving stores and explosives using his motor car, having met with Lt Boulnois and Sgt Smith after they had blown the lifting bridge they made a decision that Sgt Smith would take the Electric Exploder and a drum of cable and go with Capt Wright to deal with the Lifting bridge at Mariette in the next battalions area, while Lt Boulnois would head to the Lifting Road Bridge at Jemappes.

The Jemappes bridge had been prepared by Cpl Halewood and his sappers, the limited availability of the electric exploders meant that Sapper ingenuity had come into play. several of the houses in Jemappes near to the canal had an electricity supply and between Cpl Halewood and Lt Boulnois it was worked out that they could wire the demolitions into the lighting circuit of one of the houses and by quickly flicking on the light they could provide a suitable power source to set off the explosives. As the last British troops crossed back over the bridge under German fire Lt Boulnois flicked the switch at the very moment that the power to the village failed. The bridge could not be blown and The Sapper dems team had to withdraw with the infantry.

The last bridge in the 3 Division area was in the Northumberland Fusiliers area

• Lifting Road bridge at Mariette.

This was a double bridge as at various sections along the south side of the canal there was a deep drainage channel. The canal bridge was 60′ wide with the lifting mechanism on the northern bank, and the bridge over the drainage channel was 20′. The canal bridge had been prepared for demolition with the electrical wires on the tow path.

below is a sketch map taken from the Northumberland Gunner Website showing the layout of the Northumberland Fusiliers in Mariette and the position of the bridge, tow path and the drainage channel.

http://northumbriangunner.blogspot.com/2014/03/mons-mariette.html

The bridge was under heavy fire and it was necessary to connect the cables on the tow path with the cables, that Sgt Smith had brought with him, to the electric exploder. To do so would mean being exposed to enemy fire, so Capt Wright attempted to cross the drainage channel bridge from underneath by going hand over hand from the girders. unfortunately a head wound sustained earlier when he was near LCpl Jarvis’s demolition site had severely weakened him and after several attempts he fell into the drainage channel and had to be rescued by Sgt Smith. Unfortunately the bridge couldn’t be blown and Smith and Wright were forced to withdraw with B Company of the Northumberland Fusiliers. Wright would receive the VC for his efforts on this day.

5 Division’s Area – St Ghislain, Les Herbieres, and Pommeroeul

This Division area was the responsibility of the Division’s 2 Field Companies:

• 17 Field Company RE
• 59 Field Company RE

The first section of the Canal in the 5 Div area was a 3000 yard stretch that was the responsibility of 1st Bn Queens own Royal West Kents. This section covered the small town of St Ghislain and had 3 Bridges, these were the responsibility of 17 field Company RE

• Fixed Iron Railway bridge

• Bridge at Lock No 3

• Lifting Road bridge

The 3 bridges in this area had been well prepared for demolition but they were finished while under direct fire, but by the evening all charges were secured and the cables running back to a well placed firing position However but the railway bridge came under shell fire and some of the gun cotton charges were blown off from the beams and girders. Cpl Marsden attempted to fix them back in place but was killed before he could finish the task. 2nd Lt Godsell and Sgt Payne detonate the demolition with the electrical exploder and the bridge is successfully blown.

The bridge at Lock 3 is blown by Cpl Gerachty and the heavy iron lifting road bridge is successfully blown by Cpl Taylor.

the next section of canal is a 1000 yard frontage and manned by the 2nd Bn KOSB, this has one bridge at Les Herbieres.

• Iron Road bridge at Lock No 4

this bridge is prepared for demolition by Lt Pottinger and his section of 17 Field Company RE. The order to blow the bridge is given and the Electrical Exploder fails to function. after several attempts it is realised that the exploder has a fault inside and it isn’t possible to now attach safety fuse. However this doesn’t stop Lt Pottinger attempting to shoot that the detonators with his webley in the hope that that may set of the explosives. this wasn’t an act of desperation as such, as Lt Pottinger was an Army champion shot with the revolver. Unfortunately his efforts came to naught and the bridge had to be left intact while the Sappers and Infantry withdrew under fire.

17 Field company RE also sank an number of canal barges, using 1 lbs of gun cotton at the keel, to prevent them being used as improvised crossings.

The next section of canal was in the responsibility of 1st Bn East Surrey Regt of 14 Brigade and the bridges were the responsibility of 59 Field Company RE. there was 2 bridges in the Surrey’s area and these were the responsibility of 1 Section under the command of Lt Pennycuick RE

• Fixed Railway bridge (Plate Girder construction)

• Double Road Bridge – a Fixed bridge over a drainage channel and a lift bridge over the Canal, known as the Pont D’Hautrage

Both of these bridges were successfully blown, from all of the references and articles there is no mention on how these were detonated or whether they were under fire.

The final section of the 5 Div area was defended by the 1st Bn Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. There were 2 bridges on this section of the Canal and they were the responsibility of Lt Flint and No3 section of 59 Field Company RE.

• Lifting Bridge on the Pommeroeul to Thulin Road
• Wooden Bridge at Lock No 5.

While these bridges were being prepared for demolition the CO of 1 DCLI voiced concern that his battalion may end up being stuck as there was a small river that ran parallel with the canal, approximately 600 yards to the south. To lessen the risk a section from 59 Field Company RE build a pontoon bridge to provide a crossing for the Battalion.

The problem that Lt Flint and his sappers had was that their bridges were under direct fire from a German Field Gun situated a mile to the north of them. despite this, both Bridges were successfully blown. The Pontoon Bridge provided a key lifeline for the DCLI but unfortunately it could not be stripped out as time did not allow and had to be destroyed to deny the Germans a crossing point.

19 Brigade Area – Pommeroeul to Conde

The area west of Lock No 5 across to Conde was initially covered by the regiments of the Cavalry Brigades, they had pushed forward and the Brigades were supported by 2 & 3 Field Troop RE of the Field Squadron RE (Note – it was not numbered at this point as it was the only RE Field Squadron, it would be another 2 weeks until 2nd Field Squadron was created and at that point it would take on the number of 1st Fd Sqn RE)

the cavalry would be relieved by Infantry of 19 Brigade at about 1530hrs on the 23 Aug, this would allow more of them to push forward to recce and to engage the Germans. The Field Troops had responsibility for 5 Bridges which they had been preparing for demolition for most of the afternoon. 3 of the bridges were to the south of Pommeroeul and the other 2 were further west at the village of St Aybert.

Pommeroeul –

• A Lift Bridge over the Canal
• slightly west of the above bridge – A metal Lift Bridge over the Canal
• Wooden bridge over the river just to the south of the above bridge

St Aybert –

• A Lift bridge at the east end of the village
• A Girder Bridge in the middle of the village

by 1530hrs B Company 1st Middlesex Regt had moved up to the Canal and were now in place and supporting the RE Troops working at the bridges.By 1630hrs the Bridges were under heavy fire from the Germans of 8 Division. The eastern bridge is not destroyed until British cavalry units have returned over it and it is blown at 1715hrs with the other 2 Pommeroeul bridges destroyed shortly after.

The bridges at St Ayberts are held for longer to allow the 6th Dragoons Guards to withdraw over the Canal. The last of the 6 DG cross the Bridges at about 0230hrs on the 24th Aug and the Field Troop blows both bridges at 0300hrs. Both Field Troops withdrew back to the Sqn HQ at Quievrain and would then start the Retreat.

Conclusion

This has been an interesting project to dig into, particularly as it has such an important part played by 2 Mounted Sapper Units, of which I’ll do a bit more of a detailed posting. As for the other units it is interesting to see that there is a real mixed bag of results.

That isn’t a criticism, every unit was carrying out demolitions while under fire, with not enough explosives, limited electric exploders and next to no instantaneous fuse. Add to that the order for 56 Field Company RE not start preparing Demolitions until 0630hrs on the 23rd Aug – a whole night lost, and then the enemy were were on top of you before you start!

I’ve tried to get as many old photos of the bridges as I can, and when you look at the range of bridge type, construction and materials it is clear that that the Sappers worked bloody miracles with the resources and time available to blow as many bridges as they did. There has been a real mix of bravery and madness to be found as you move from each bridge and lock.

Hopefully I’ve managed to add a bit more to the Battle of Mons than the usual stories of the first shots of the Great War and winning of the first VCs of the war (not to take anything away from those stories) but I wanted to look at a very sapper aspect of the battle.

References:

RE Field Sqn War Diary 22 Aug 1914 – 1 Sep 1914

59 Field Coy RE, War Diary, 22 Aug 1914- 1 sep 1914

Capt EW Cox RE “Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No3 Senior Officers’ Class, SME” The Royal Engineers Journal, September 1913

Maj Gen Sir Reginald Buckland “Demolitions Carried Out at Mons and during the retreat, 1914”, The Royal Engineers Journal, March 1932

2Lt KB Godsell RE (17 Fld Coy RE) “The First Month of World War 1 – extract of Personal notes jotted down by the wayside”, The Royal Engineers Journal, March 1974

Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave ” Mons 1914″, Pen and Sword Publishing, 2000

David Lomas, ” Mons 1914, The BEF’s Tactical Triumph” Campaign Series, Osprey Publishing, 8th Impression 2008

Jon Cooksey & Jerry Murland ” The Retreat from Mons 1914: North, Casteau to Le Cateau”, Battle Lines Series, Pen and Sword Publishing, 2014