This will be the first of a number of blog posts over time that will look to correct some of the incorrect details and negative views put forward in The Royal Engineers History, Volume 51. So what’s my problem with this? The Field Squadrons and Field Troops have their own chapter in Volume 5, focused on the units on the Western Front, and this is Chapter 162, my problem is that it is one of the only chapters in the volume that is negative and dismissive of the works of the Sappers and Officers in the Great War. It also has been written in a way where the opinion of the Author is used more than actually stating facts or details, which is at odds with many of the other chapters that are written in a more factual way.
Now let me make this clear, I am a serving Sapper and have been for 36 years, I’m incredibly proud of my Corps history but I feel that the Field Squadrons and Troops of the Corps are being done a disservice by the Corps written history.
I did originally planned to do this as an article for the RE Journal, however the further that I dug into Volume 5 for research, then cross referenced with war diaries and other documents I realise that there was too much to try and squeeze into a 2000-3000 word article. To that end I plan to pick up on a topic area and then explore it and go through the details that I’ve found that contradicts the detail or explain what has been stated in Volume 5 and why I consider it to be incorrect or misleading.
Now I complained that the Author has stated opinion in the article, I will also be giving my opinion and some assumptions but I will aim to point them out and support/ justify them with my rationale behind my views and assumptions.
When I volunteered to take part in the War Horse Ride in 2014, I felt that I needed to understand the history of the period and the unit I was being asked to ride in memory of, and so started the research in the Mounted Sappers and my evolution/ creation of the Horseback Sapper began. I used the Corps History Volume 5 as my first point of call and supported by websites like the https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/ 3 . At this point I was soaking in information but it was only from 2016 onwards when armed with more information that I started to see the negative side of Chapter 16. With further research and more time spent in the unit war diaries and in the articles in the RE Journal I started to see that the research for the chapter was only surface deep and seemed to lack some of the knowledge of someone that served with the Field Sqns in the Great War, and my suspicion was that they may not have served in the Great War at all 4, the author uses large elements of Colonel WH Evens DSO RE Journal article from 1926 5. Indeed Volume 5 lists all of the people that helped in the production of the Great War Volumes but it doesn’t attribute who wrote what chapters. I’ve even asked the Institution of Royal Engineers and the RE Historical Society if they have the details about who wrote each chapter and unfortunately they don’t. I’ve even been compiling the list of officers that served with a mounted RE unit and so far none of the names appear listed in the front of Volume 5, (also bear in mind the Volume 5 was published in 1952.)
So lets focus on the first area of contention – The manning size and scale of the RE Field Squadrons.
The following are quotes from Chapter 16 of Volume 5:
“A Cavalry Division had a Field Squadron RE consisting of a HQ and 4 troops, each troop an establishment of one officer and about 40 NCOs and Men.” (page 426)
“The establishment of a Field Squadron was 225 men and the same number of horses” (page 427)
“A Field Squadron was not an economical unit. From a whole squadron it was impossible, even under favourable conditions to provide a dismounted working party of more than 70 NCOs and men, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive.” (page 427)
This last statement is repeated a number of times through the chapter and while the number is correct, the reasoning is wrong, but I’ll get to that in due course.
So looking at the first quote. At the start of the war the Field Squadron is an HQ and 4 Field Troops, this allows for a Field Troop to be allocated to each Cavalry Brigade, while that may seem a small amount of sappers to a Brigade Formation when you compare an Infantry Division had 2 Field Companies (later 3 Field Coys) to cover the 3 Infantry Brigades. However something that has been missed by the Author is that Field Engineering was not an unknown quantity to the Cavalry. In every Cavalry Squadron there would be 12 trained Cavalry Pioneers (9 in the Household Cavalry Squadrons)5 who had completed and passed a Field Engineering Cadre delivered by the RE Field Squadron, along side that every Cavalry Subaltan would have had a Field Engineering module included in their Troop Commanders Course – so a typical Line Cavalry Regiment would have at least 48 Cavalry pioneers trained in the following:
- Crossing Rivers by improvised means and using Air raft equipment.7
- Demolitions of railways and bridges.
- demolition and repair of telephone lines
- Construction of simple field defence works, entrenchments and loopholes.
All of this training was done in accordance with the manual of Field Engineering8.
The part that is wrong in the first statement is the numbers in a Field Troop, while Volume 5 states 1+40 the reality is that this is the rough number for a Field Section of a RE Field Company. The Field Troop was actually 1 Officer and 30 NCOs and soldiers.
So where where might the 1+40 number come from if it’s not a mistake from the Field section? Well a very good lecture was given and written up for the RE Journal by Capt E.W. Cox RE in 1913 where he provides a lecture at the School of Military Engineering to No.3 Senior Officers Class9 with reference Field troops and their role and function with the Cavalry Divisions and Brigades. This is a really useful article with a lot of information but it does move between the Troops of the Squadron supporting the Cavalry Division and it’s Brigade, and the Field Troop that supports the Independent Cavalry Brigade. why is there a difference. This “Independent” field troop is self supporting as it has more personnel to allow for it’s own HQ, a slightly larger field troop element and a small integral Echelon. The field troop element is bigger to support a slightly larger Brigade organisation and this element is 1+40, I suspect that this may be where the Author picked up the number from.
Just to close this out as well not all Squadrons had 4 Field Troops, once fully established 1 and 2 Field Squadrons did have 4 Troops, but 3 Field Squadron operated with 3 Field Troops and both the 1st Indian Field Squadron (later renumbered 4 Field Sqn) and 2nd Indian Field Sqn (later renumbered 5 Field Sqn) each eventually had 3 Field troops.10
Moving onto the overall number in the Field Squadron (based on a 4 Troop Unit), while the Author states that it is 225 officers and Soldiers, this is an odd figure and there is only one set of figures that I have found that comes close to this number and I’m not convinced that this is how the figure was selected, but we’ll look at that in a moment.
Based on the Field Service Book 1914, the peace time and war establishment for a RE Field Squadron is 7 officers and 184 Men11.
This breaks down as follows:
Sqn HQ – 2 officers + 10 men
Field Troops x 4 – 1 Officer + 30 men each (4 officers and 120 men)
B Echelon – 1 Officer + 54 Men
So we have a full strength RE Field Squadron of 4 Field Troops of 191 personnel. this is some what short of the 225 number. The only figures that get close to this number is if you add the additional personnel of the assumed troop size of 1+40, but the establishment tables and the war diaries state that the Field Troops are 30 or less (at several points in the war Troop strength even gets as low as 18 men)
From the Field service book a RE Field Company is 11 officers and 211 men (Peace time establishment) and 6 officers and 211 men on War establishment.
The only other way that the numbers could have been made up is by taking the figures for an Indian Engineer Field Troop of 3 Officers and 56 men and multiplying that by 4 troops12, but I think this is the least likely method of calculating that figure. It is my view that the Author has use his original figure of 1 + 40 for each of the Field Troops and then added in the HQ and Echelon.
The author makes great reference to the fact that the Field Squadrons can only muster 70 men into the trenches to carry out engineering work. The author attributes this as a fact that the remainder of the Squadron is needed to look after the horses away from the Front. This reason is completely wrong and I will address this in a separate blog post as it deserves debunking, in a significant way, as it also appears as the rationale in a number of other arguments against the Cavalry as a whole. So bear with me on that point.
However I can explain and justify the figure of 70 men in the trenches. The figure of 70 men in the trenches regularly appears in 2nd Field Sqn RE war diary for Spring and early Summer 1915, it is also a figure that is briefly used for 1st Field Squadron RE in late 1914 while they are working in the trenches near Ypres. So up to this point the Corps History is correct, but we need to consider a couple of things. For the Field Squadrons this is a period of change and building up and development, going from a single Field Squadron and an Independent Field Troop to 3 field squadrons, which means that at times these units have been below strength while they each became established, on occasions even loaning complete Field Troops and equipment to allow the creation of the new unit. 13
More importantly the reason that you have this type of figure is not down to the number of people available but down to how a Field Engineering unit actually works:
A RE Field unit such as a Squadron or Company is a self contained unit that can be called on to carry out Field Engineering of a variety of forms and tasks, but to do this the unit has the Field Troops as the working or task delivery unit but anyone that has worked as a sapper or with sappers knows that engineering works consumes a significant amount of Engineering and Construction Resources.
So to keep the Field Troops supplied the Squadron has an Echelon – the In-Unit Quartermaster department that holds the big stores and equipment, and deals with demanding stores from Higher formation, either for specific tasks or as it’s own holdings are issued, expended or damaged. So the 1 officer and 54 members of a Field Squadron are not in the trenches, they are demanding stores and pushing the stores down to the Field Troops on the ground or in the Trenches. As a Echelon Commander friend of mine would regularly say “No War without G4!” and it is very true of the Great War, to deliver effect Sapper units consume engineering stores.
In addition the Echelon was providing a service to the wider Cavalry Division. All formations and units used horse drawn wagons, what happens when you have a damaged cart wheel, axle or body work of your horse drawn vehicle? Units would take it to the RE Field Squadron’s Echelon where the RE Tradesmen would carry out repairs – Wheelwrights, cart-wrights, carpenters and Blacksmiths. Right across all of the unit’s war diaries you will find the references to the repair work carried out to the Cavalry Division’s horse drawn vehicles, so the statement that “, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive” is very much incorrect.
Also the Squadron HQ is not likely to be all in the trenches, the Command element may be in the trenches but the Administration element will be near but doing their job of administrating the unit particularly as it may have Field Troops with different Brigades and Divisions, and the orders from Division will need to come into a functioning HQ. So these guys are not realistically in the 70 troop numbers.
So that leaves the 4 x Field Troops. Now it is important to break down that number of 1+30 in each troop. A full strength Field Troop has 30 NCOs and men, this is made up of 23 Sappers (NCOs and Men) and 7 Drivers. The Drivers form the unit 1st line Transport and supply and it is likely that these men are not in the trenches on a permanent basis.
Why? The period that the RE Troops are in the trenches is usually between 14-30 days at a time, they are not rotating out in the same way the infantry are, these guys are working in the trenches for that full period. If they are working then they are consuming G4 Stores and they need regular resupply and that bringing forward of supplies falls to the 1st line transport and supply from the Field Troops. These guys are not sat on their arse back in the Echelon, they are bringing forward the equipment and stores ready for the next day/night of engineering tasks.
To that end with an upto strength unit you are looking at 92 NCOs and Sappers in the trenches but in the period of 1914/15 the Squardons are working working at 2 or 3 Troop strength and that is closer to the 70 figure.
Once the Cavalry Divisions are re-organised to create the Dismounted Cavalry Units for the Trenches in 1916 and 1917 what you find is that a Division can create a Dismounted Brigade – This is because a Cavalry Regiment is in man power terms half the strength of an Infantry Battalion. This is then matched by the Field Squadrons as they work on supplying a Dismounted Troop of 30 NCOs and Sappers to support a Brigade (also remember those cavalry regiments also have their Cavalry Pioneers – The RE Field Squadrons are still running these training courses and refresher courses to the Cavalry Units through out the war as well).
The last point I want to make about the 70 NCOs and Sappers that are working in the Trenches of 1914 and 1915, they are not ineffective or unproductive as the Chapter 16 Author suggests, when you read the War diaries of 1st and 2nd Field Squadrons during their time in the trenches, they are regularly supervising and managing working parties of between 700-1500 personnel which is not bad for a small unit, In my opinion that’s punching above your weight and delivering effect. But that isn’t by accident or simply being forced on the unit. This ability to manage large working parties was pointed out by Capt Cox14 as an essential skill of the Sappers and NCOs of the Field Troop, and the “Duty of Supervision” was highlighted as a requirement of the Field Troops by Sir Douglas Haig in his report on Cavalry Divisional Training of 1909.
In my view the 70 men of the Field Squadrons when dismounted and working in the trenches, are in the good old fashioned traditions of the Corps, a force multiplier and delivering a significant Engineering effect. I fully accept that they are a smaller capability compared to the 2 Field Companies (later increased to 3 Companies)in the Infantry Divisions but they are most definitely a productive and economical Sapper unit, and that 70 man dismounted unit was regularly producing Engineering Effect with Working parties of 1500 men.
OK, that’s the first of the rants over, time to catch my breath and get ready for the next one.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
3. http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk – An excellent site for information on the Great War.
4. My view is that the Author has the view that the Squadrons would have been more productive and more mobile if mounted in lorries rather than on horse back. while the British Army at the time was embracing mechanisation more than the other armys, the all terrain capabilities of the lorry at the time was not great and the Lorry was viewed as an Logistic asset to be used at higher formation level – this will be a discussion post in the future. Also the Author does not understand the role and function of the Cavalry of the Great War. His view is that they were the “Shock of Impact” of charging horsemen, rather than the multi role capability designed to operate on the flanks, move rapidly to plug/ exploit gaps, carry out recce etc – again a topic that I will come back to in a separate blog post.
5. Colonel WH Evans DSO (1926) Brief History of the Royal Engineers with Cavalry in France During the War 1914-1918, RE Journal 1926. – this is a really good article split across 2 editions of the Journal in 1926, but it is as it suggests a brief history and while it gives some detailed info about Officers with the Squadrons it is a “Big Hand” overview. When you read this article and Chapter 16 you can see big chunks of the article lifted into the Chapter. The article gives a taste and should point you to specific areas of the war diaries.
6. Chapter 5, Section 156, Cavalry Training Manual (1915), General Staff, War Office.
7. Air raft Equipment, Section 7, Military Engineering Part 3B, Military Bridging. (1914), General Staff, War Office
8. Manual of Field Engineering (1911), General Staff, War Office.
9. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
10. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
11. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 12 – War Establishments of Various Units, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
12. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 13 India -Cavalry Brigade, War Establishments, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
13. Page 21, 25th Sep 1914, 1st Field Squadron War Diary, – 4 Field Troop and Equipment detached temporarily from 1 Field Squadron RE to help form 2nd Field Squadron, the Troop would return at the end of October 1914.
14. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Page 156, Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
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