So a couple of months ago I was contacted by a good mate, Andy Smerdon, he was having a clear out of some of his old kit as he had down sized and as he is now living on a boat. He had come across a Royal Engineers Riding Crop that he had forgotten about and thought that I would be the ideal person to have it.
We’ll as much as I already have a RE riding crop, I’m not one to turn down such a great offer, so I said yes and Andy said he would post it onto my home address.
My RE whip is very similar to the one carried in this photo, silver topped with the RE cap badge on it.
I was expecting the whip to be very similar to the one that I already have, a long thin whip as carried by Sappers and Drivers and often used in place of a walking out cane that Sappers of non mounted units were fond of. What actually arrived was some what different and real surprise.
What actually turned up was a horn handled hunting whip, in very good condition, with 2 silver collars on it. I use a similar type of whip when I do Living History as an RE Officer as it fits the image and is quite common in photos of the time.
I had a good look at the whip to find out what made it a RE related item?
It was one of the first prizes at the Mounted Sports event held at the Engineer Training Centre (ETC) at Newark in 1916 and it was the 1st prize for the Officers Jumping Event. The event was won by DC Lovick RE.
I decide that I would try and find out who DC Lovick RE was and perhaps to see if I could find out what happened to him. So a quick search of the National Archives allowed me to find this chap’s Medal Card. And it seems that he was a 2Lt in 1916, and was promoted Captain.
I now know his name is Donald Currie Lovick, and he deployed to France in November 1916, he is awarded the British war medal and I can make out some writing in the Victory Medal box.
I decided to just do a check to see if he survived the war, since I still had my ancestry account, as I use it to research my family tree, I went looking for any information that might suggest if he survived. The initial search throw up around 113 records for the name Lovick, but the Donald Currie really narrowed it down.
The first thing found was a birth registry for 1885/1886, born in Aylsham Norfolk – was he 40 years old when he enlisted and became and Officer, while it isn’t unheard of, it is unusual? time to dig a bit more.
I find his death is registered in January 1962, aged 86, in Maldon Essex, so it initially appears that he is still in and around the East Anglia area.
The next thing that appeared was our Donald Lovick appears on the list of members of a Freemason Lodge. This isn’t unusual for the period where freemasonry was a popular activity across Britain and the Empire. What surprised me was the Lodge that he was a member of Lodge 1331 Aldershot Camp Lodge, having been listed as joining in 1903. That is mainly a Military Lodge and also what is an East Anglian man doing in Aldershot in 1903? Has he been in the Army before? Time to continue digging.
Checking the census for 1911 starts to throw more light on things. Donald Currie Lovick has served before and is listed as a Quartermaster Sergeant Royal Engineers at the School of Military Engineering, Brompton Barracks, Chatham. On the census it lists his trade as Storekeeper.
Donald is listed at line 20
This suggests that Donald has now been commissioned from the ranks sometime between 1911 and 1916 and I now start to wonder if he has been commissioned as a Quartermaster or as a unit officer, considering at the time both would have been given the rank of 2Lt. This now explains why we have a 40 year old man at a Training Depot in 1916. Also ETC Newark was a training Depot for Soldiers, not for officers, so that suggests that Donald was there as part of the Staff.
The next thing to go looking for just to see what Donald’s earlier service was and the 1901 census start to give more detail for me. In 1901 Donald is in Aldershot and is a Corporal in B Troop of the Bridging Battalion Royal Engineers, we have a Mounted Sapper! The census states that all those listed in the census book are part of the Royal Engineers Mounted and Imperial Yeomanry in Aldershot.
This would now explain why a 40 year old crusty 2Lt has won first prize in the Officer Sports Event at Newark in 1916, probably beating some of the younger bloods. This old boy has been knocking around military horses for a bit of time!
I can’t find any entries for Donald in the 1891 census when he would have been 15 or 16. It may be that he was already enlisted and serving as a boy soldier but I can’t see any information on that. Also I don’t have access to his Service Records.
The last bit of information that I have from 1939 about our Donald is that he was living in Maldon, Essex and was listed on councils register as “Captain RE Retired” and that he is listed as a School of Military Engineering Instructor. Does this suggest that Donald went back to the SME at Chatham after the war? This is something that I’d like to try and dig a bit deeper into and may be a project for later this year.
Either way this has been an interesting research job, to now know that I have a very nice riding whip won and carried by a Late Entry Mounted Sapper. I’d like to know a bit more about Captain Donald Currie Lovick RE, but for the moment what I have found it isn’t a bad bit of history from being gifted a riding crop that my mate was clearing out.
Chapter 16’s author makes the assertion that the RE Field Squadrons would have been more mobile and effective if they had been completely mechanised and mounted in 3 ton Motor Lorries. I’m not convinced by this so I thought that I had best look into the details. So with a lot of trawling through the war diaries and also digging into the world of logistics, it has been a fascinating bit of research and it has also highlighted quite a lot of information for later blog posts.
However the basis of this post is to take us a step further on from my last about the Authors assertion that large quantities of unit manpower was lost due to looking after the horses, In this post I’ll look at the reality of 3 Ton Lorry with the Field Squadrons and also if the Author has made a correct assessment or has he missed the mark. Below are the quotes from Chapter 16:
“Even if the cavalry had had their chance, it is difficult to imagine any possible circumstances in which their engineers, if carried in motor transport, could not have served them far better than if mounted on horses.“
“An important item in the equipment of a field squadron was the 3 ton lorry allocated in 1915 for the transport of the Divisional reserve of entrenching tools – 500 picks and shovels. At times , unfortunately only for short periods, up to thirty dismounted Sappers would be attached to a Squadron. These men could be moved by dumping the reserve tools from the lorry, and it was this possible to increase the effective value of the Squadron by about 50%. Even with this example of the results from to be obtained from their mechanical transport, the Squadrons still kept their horses, though in none of the tasks their which they were employed, as given above, where any of their horses of any use. The man is was who became the slave of the horse.“
“they were undoubtedly hampered by their horses, and the substitution of light motor lorries as a means of transport would in no way have reduced their mobility; far from it.”
Chapter 16 suggest that all squadrons had a 3 ton lorry issued to them in 1915 to carry a stores allocation of 500 shovels and picks. These were required for the use by the working parties that the Squadrons supervised.
The above information comes from Chapter 16 and is only partially correct as the war diaries of the Mounted Squadrons only show that 1st Field Squadron had this vehicle and equipment allocated to them, this was allocated to them, along with 2 Army Service Corps (ASC) drivers on the 16 February 1915. The vehicle was allocated from the Divisional Supply Column and technically they didn’t own the vehicle as it remained a Divisional Asset. The war diary makes it clear that vehicle is for moving the 500 Picks and 500 Shovels. It’s made very clear that the vehicle and drivers are not Squadron assets when the War Diary has an entry for 17 February 1915 (One day after they arrived) that the unit loses one of the ASC drivers back to the supply column.
On the 22 February 1915 the Squadron is tasked with carrying out works at Ypres and 5 Officers and 78 men are allocated the task. The war diary states these men are moved by Motor Bus, not by the attached Lorry as that would have moved the stores needed for the working parties that the sappers were about to be managing. They spend 13 days working in the trenches are were returned back to the Echelon location again by Motor Bus.
The next mention of the Tool Lorry is on the 2nd Oct 1915 when the Squadron is tasked to carry out works to reverse and repair former German Trenches to the West of Loos. The war diary states that the tool lorry moves the tools to Noyelles. It is interesting to note that this location is just over 5 miles from where the work is going to take place, this is important as it is something that I will come back to later on in this post. Either way the 70 NCOs and Sappers of the Sqn and the 1000 man working party from 1 Cavalry Division would have collected their tools from this location and then taken them to the old German Trenches that needed the work.
The Sappers and the Cavalrymen complete their works on 6 October 1915 and are moved back to their respective units by……Motor Bus! still not moving by the tool lorry.
The next time that the Tool Lorry is mentioned is 9 May 1916 when the lorry and the ASC driver rejoin the Divisional Supply Column. The war diary is very clear and uses the word “rejoin”, which suggests that it was only loaned or on attachment.
The tool lorry does come back to the Field Squadron, on the 14th April 1917 and stays with the unit for 7 days before being sent/ returned to Cavalry Corps Depot.
The last mention of the use of a Lorry by the squadron is on 17 May 1917 when 2 Officers and 32 Sappers are moved by lorry to work with Pioneers of 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigade. It doesn’t suggest that this vehicle was the tool lorry and by this time of the war it is likely that it was one of the vehicles of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) or Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) – more on these important units in a moment.
Having gone through 2, 3, 4 and 5 Field Squadron’s War Diaries there is no mention of them having a Tool Lorry as 1st Field Squadron had. The diaries do mention being moved forward by lorries and buses but there is no indication that they are in unit elements.
So the Lorry was only with one Mounted Sapper Squadron, was not there for the whole war, it is referred to as the “Tool Lorry” and remained a Divisional (or higher) Supply asset.
However there is a bigger issue that has been ignored by the author. I believe that he has been looking at the the Great war situation with a WW2 perspective. The assertion that the Squadrons would have been far more mobile if mounted in lorries doesn’t hold up. There is a problem with this as the the vehicle of 1914-18 was significantly different to the vehicles of 1939-45.
Bear with me as I delve into this in more detail…….
Prior to the Great War the British Army was keen to look at how it could utilise the the Internal Combustion Engine vehicle as Motor transport for both logistics and troop movements. A number of pre-war exercises showed some real results, the exercises also identified some of the limitations of the vehicles as well. It was recognised that the Steam Engine while slow did deliver power and towing capability, the petrol engine was quicker and while developing quickly was still limited in it’s power capability.
The British Army entered the war with a significant amount of Motor Vehicles, especially compared to other armies of other nations. The Omnibus had been used in the pre-war exercises and had proved to be very useful and efficient, as the war progresses the BEF saw how the French Army used buses to transport troops. This resulted in the creation in 1916 of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) at Division Level and the Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) units at Corps level. These units used both buses and Lorries in the Troop Transporting roles.
The AOC and AOP of the Army Service Corps were a highly regarded asset, often praised by the Quarter Master General (QMG) and the Commander in Chief (CinC). They could move an Infantry Division incredibly Efficiently. However as a Division and Corps level asset they tended to move Battalion level units as a minimum.
The important thing to bear in mind with the Lorry, both in terms of stores and troop movements was that of the Off road capability. The Lorry of the Great War was confined to use on hardened roads. They did provide an essential capability normally from the rail heads down to Division and Brigade Echelons where horse transport would take over.
There was several factors that limited the Internal Combustion Engine Wheeled Motor transport to the hardened roads the main factors were:
Poor Mechanical reliability (this did improve through the war)
Hard Rubber tyres and wheels – pneumatic tyres burst regularly and while having a better ride quality they tended to be mainly used with the Motor Ambulances.
Limited engine power
Poor suspension.
A good image showing the solid tyres and suspension of a typical 3 ton truck
Ambulances tended to have pneumatic tyres to make the ride easier for the casualties.
Overall the ability to drive off road even in good conditions was just not viable. A lorry mounted unit allocated to support a Cavalry unit would simply not be able to keep up or follow it and considering two of the field troops principle tasks was to create Cavalry tracks and to carry out Engineer Reconnaissance, it would not be able to cross the ground that it was required to create or understand. An interesting case where this is illustrated is with Tanks, a vehicle designed to travel across country, needed to be refuelled by a 3 ton lorry with 2 gallon petrol cans but the Lorries couldn’t keep up or travel over the broken ground this resulted in the creation of tracked supply carriers (after the towed supply sledge concept proved unworkable).
Armoured Supply Carrier
The Lorry was principally a Line of Communication asset, and you need to consider the amount of works that was carried out by RE Army Troops and Labour units on road improvements and development to see how essential these were to keep the Wheeled Motor Transport (WMT) moving.
It is also interesting to note that the Geddes Report by Sir Eric Geddes in 1916 recommended that narrow gauge railway would be far more efficient at pushing logistics forward into the Combat Zone rather than Wheeled Motor Transport.
The quantity of WMT increased significantly during the war but it must also be remembered that the BEF was also increasing in manpower at the same time and a large part of that increase was the logistical tail to support the growing combat units. The “so what?” of this was that the BEF needed the vast majority of these vehicles for the movement of stores in the Line Of Communication (LOC) area and did not have the capacity to allocate these vehicles to individual units even if it wanted to.
The WMT had it’s prime role in the LOC zone and the Squadrons were lucky to have the use of a 3 Ton Lorry, but it must be remembered that the allocated vehicle was for stores movement not for troops, therefore it fits with the general principle use of the WMT in the BEF.
Despite the Author’s repeated statement that the Horse mounted Sapper was hindered by his horse (which is not the case) the unit would have been even more limited if it had been vehicle mounted, the limitation to hard roads would have stopped them providing support to most forward units let alone the staying with the cavalry.
There is always the argument that the use of more lorries would have reduced the vast quantities of fodder and feed needed by the Cavalry to sustain their Horses and Mules in the field, but the very same problem exists for these early motor vehicles – they consumed lots of petrol, which needed to be refined and shipped (also there was competing priorities between WMT and Aeroplanes for appropriate quantities of fuel), and they also consumed lots of spare parts due to their mechanical reliability. It would only be into the 1920s when the Internal combustion engine would become more reliable, more powerful and vehicle tyres and suspension would be improved enough to start dealing with driving off road in a better way.
Based on these factors it is my opinion that the Author of Chapter 16 has done a disservice to Corps and the Great War RE Field Squadrons. The Lorry of the Great War was a big leap forward in technology and a brilliant asset for the Army, and the British Army was leading the way with it’s implementation and use but the Quantity of vehicles was not enough to allocated to sub units permanently, The off road capability just didn’t exist at this time and the reliability had to be carefully managed. It just was not ready to fill the role and function with the RE Field Squadrons at this point in history, 20 years later it would be a very different story and you can see why the RE Mounted units ceased in 1937, to be replaced by Lorry mounted troops.
While the Unit War diaries have been useful as ever, one of the biggest references that I used for back ground research was Clem Maginniss’s “An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the BEF on the Western Front 1914-1918”. Lots of good Logistics information and the Corps features a lot in it, A very useful book.
In one of my next posts on Correcting/ Challenging Chapter 16, I will deal with the assertion from the Author that no engineering task could or were carried out from Horseback by the RE Field Squadrons, I have a lot of ammunition for that one……and will look at a variety of examples.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
4. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
5. Clem MaGinniss, (2018), An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918, Helion & Company
6. Sir Eric Geddes, 1916, Preliminary Statement of Personnel necessary to carry out Light Railway Recommendations of the Commander in Chief, TNA WO 32/5145
The next point that I need to address from Chapter 16 of the Corps History is that the Author attributes the lack of available manpower available for tasking is the fact that the majority of the Squadron’s personnel were occupied with looking after the horses when dismounted.
Blogger’s Note – In cavalry terms – a section relates to 4 mounted riders and a half section is 2 mounted riders, mounted units would move either by section or half section columns.
This post is linked with the numbers of 70 NCOs and Sappers being available for working in the Trenches. The author has picked on the fact that when a mounted unit dismounts 1 man in every 4 would remain mounted, gather up the reins of the other 3 horses and lead them away to a safe point/ safe area. This is the comment from Chapter 16:
“Acting as field companies when their divisions were dismounted and sent into the the line. A cavalry division could produce about 1200 rifles and a field squadron at most seventy men to go with them. Small though these numbers may appear, they meant that each man left behind had at least four horses to look after.“
I have already justified the 70 men number but I want to look specifically at the “1 in 4” misconception. As stated above it was true that when a Mounted unit dismounts 1 man of each Mounted section (a 4 man team) would stay mounted and ride away with the horses. This is described clearly in the Cavalry Training Manual of 1915, Section 153 and Section 213, this states that the No3 Rider of the section would remain mounted, take the reins of the other 3 horses (2 on his left and one on his right) and lead them to a specified rear area. It is also stated in the Cavalry Regulations of 1907 (Sect 106).
Image from WW2 but clearly shows the principle of No3 Rider moving the horses away at pace to a safe rear area
Kings Troop RHA still use the same principles and skills today to exercise their horses while using minimal personnel
mules left tied on a picket line with their nose bags
To make this even more RE Field Squadron specific, Mounted Sappers were required to be trained to Mounted Infantry Standards and the governing manual was the Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training Manual of 1912 and the relevant sections for dismounted action and leading horses was Section 108 and Section 149. These regulations all match.
So the Chapter 16 Author is right?…..Err….No, no he isn’t, he completely has misunderstood the 1 in 4 rule.
Everything that is quoted above related to riding into combat (advance to contact if you will) and then the unit dismounts to fight. This isn’t about going into the trenches (into the line). If the squadron was going into the Trenches then the horses would be back with the Echelon and in Horse Lines – I’ll talk about this later in this post.
Horse Holders of 4 ALH
But coming back to the dismounted combat, with the horses ridden back to safe area the No 3 rider would dismount and manage the horses dismounted. If more men were required on the firing line then the man of every second section would go forward, leaving one man with 8 horses (possibly bringing forward the extra ammunition bandoliers that were hanging round each horses neck). So in theory for a full strength Field Troop of 1 officer and 23 Sappers (remember that 7 drivers are with the Troop GS wagon and Troop Tool Cart) would only require 3 horse holders not the 6 suggested.
So that is in the field, under fire, so what about when the unit went forward into the Trenches?
Well the unit horses would be held at the Echelon location or at a Brigade Cavalry Lines and these locations would not require the loss of a man in every 4. Horses that are held in a rear area would be held on a picqueted line or in more formal horse lines and this would allow for the horses to be tied onto the horse line and then managed by a small number of men. the management of picqueted horses and horse lines is very clearly laid out in the horse management manuals and the Light Horse Pocket Book of the Australian Light Horse (ALH) explains the horse lines duties very clearly:
4 ALH horse lines in Egypt
Page 49 – Day Stable Picquet
1 man per half Squadron (ALH Squadrons are only slightly smaller than an RE Field Squadron at 150 men) will start duty at “Morning Stables” until relieved by the Night Stable piquet.
Duties –
Keep the horse lines clean
Prevent Horses from Injuring themselves
Remove Nose Bags and make out hay ration if issued.
Make sure that all horses are quiet
Make fast any horses that get loose or draw their pegs
Replace rugs/ blankets that fall off
In the event of rain then cover over the nose bags, forage, clothing etc
Act as the horse lines sentry, prevent any smoking, and prevent unauthorised persons from entering the horse lines.
At night time this picquet is increased to a Section (NCO plus 3 men). These individuals are on one at a time on a 2 hour shift/ stag with very similar duties as the day stable piquet. The only difference is that they are to make sure that men of the squadron do not loiter around the horse lines.
These duties and details are standard for British and Imperial mounted units.
A well established and set up rear area horse lines.
Therefore it can be seen that when a RE mounted unit has it’s horses in the horse lines then you are looking at 2 men during the day from the Squadron total,( field Troops and echelon) and then at night this would go upto 8 men. In all of these situations these are the maximum figures and even with the Field Troops in the trenches it is manageable from those troops of the Echelon as they would have to do these duties for their own horses anyway.
So we can see that the author of Chapter 16 is wildly incorrect in the statement that “man had become the slave of horse”.
My view is that the author has not spent time with horses but has latched onto the view that all horse management when the unit dismounts requires 1 Sapper out of 4 men to be fully employed to look after the horses, The suggestion from the author would be that the horses would require 48 men to look after them (that is almost all of the Echelon or 2 Field Troops). Hopefully I have shown that this is not the case and again I feel that the lack of actual knowledge or research by the author has allowed the Mounted Sappers of the Field Squadrons to be unfairly characterised as being inefficient and/or ineffective.
The question to ask of the Author, if the RE Field Squadrons were so inefficient and ineffective why were they expanded from one Field Squadron to five Field Squadrons (not including the Australian Field Squadrons)?
Canadian Cavalry, Possibly the Fort Garry Horse, with the Troop carrying out a Stables parade on the horse lines. This would be compulsory attendance for all men of the unit to attend to work on their horse – The Unit Adjutant and Duty Officer were not even exempt!
Bloggers Note – I want to just add that Horse and Mule Management was taken incredibly seriously by the British Army, it had learned hard lessons from the Boer War and looking after the equines was an important task. The RE Mounted Units were an important part of that process be that creating wind breaks and shelters for the temporary Horse lines in the Cavalry Holding areas or for the construction of better horse lines in the rear areas.
Please go back over this post and have a look at all of the Horse line images and look at how few men are with the horses on the line. This was a routine duty and had little impact on the manpower or effectiveness of the Field Squadrons.
In one of the future blog posts I will look at dispelling the myth that the Mounted sappers could not carry out engineering when mounted.
This will be the first of a number of blog posts over time that will look to correct some of the incorrect details and negative views put forward in The Royal Engineers History, Volume 51. So what’s my problem with this? The Field Squadrons and Field Troops have their own chapter in Volume 5, focused on the units on the Western Front, and this is Chapter 162, my problem is that it is one of the only chapters in the volume that is negative and dismissive of the works of the Sappers and Officers in the Great War. It also has been written in a way where the opinion of the Author is used more than actually stating facts or details, which is at odds with many of the other chapters that are written in a more factual way.
Now let me make this clear, I am a serving Sapper and have been for 36 years, I’m incredibly proud of my Corps history but I feel that the Field Squadrons and Troops of the Corps are being done a disservice by the Corps written history.
I did originally planned to do this as an article for the RE Journal, however the further that I dug into Volume 5 for research, then cross referenced with war diaries and other documents I realise that there was too much to try and squeeze into a 2000-3000 word article. To that end I plan to pick up on a topic area and then explore it and go through the details that I’ve found that contradicts the detail or explain what has been stated in Volume 5 and why I consider it to be incorrect or misleading.
Now I complained that the Author has stated opinion in the article, I will also be giving my opinion and some assumptions but I will aim to point them out and support/ justify them with my rationale behind my views and assumptions.
When I volunteered to take part in the War Horse Ride in 2014, I felt that I needed to understand the history of the period and the unit I was being asked to ride in memory of, and so started the research in the Mounted Sappers and my evolution/ creation of the Horseback Sapper began. I used the Corps History Volume 5 as my first point of call and supported by websites like the https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/ 3 . At this point I was soaking in information but it was only from 2016 onwards when armed with more information that I started to see the negative side of Chapter 16. With further research and more time spent in the unit war diaries and in the articles in the RE Journal I started to see that the research for the chapter was only surface deep and seemed to lack some of the knowledge of someone that served with the Field Sqns in the Great War, and my suspicion was that they may not have served in the Great War at all 4, the author uses large elements of Colonel WH Evens DSO RE Journal article from 1926 5. Indeed Volume 5 lists all of the people that helped in the production of the Great War Volumes but it doesn’t attribute who wrote what chapters. I’ve even asked the Institution of Royal Engineers and the RE Historical Society if they have the details about who wrote each chapter and unfortunately they don’t. I’ve even been compiling the list of officers that served with a mounted RE unit and so far none of the names appear listed in the front of Volume 5, (also bear in mind the Volume 5 was published in 1952.)
So lets focus on the first area of contention – The manning size and scale of the RE Field Squadrons.
The following are quotes from Chapter 16 of Volume 5:
“A Cavalry Division had a Field Squadron RE consisting of a HQ and 4 troops, each troop an establishment of one officer and about 40 NCOs and Men.” (page 426)
“The establishment of a Field Squadron was 225 men and the same number of horses” (page 427)
“A Field Squadron was not an economical unit. From a whole squadron it was impossible, even under favourable conditions to provide a dismounted working party of more than 70 NCOs and men, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive.” (page 427)
This last statement is repeated a number of times through the chapter and while the number is correct, the reasoning is wrong, but I’ll get to that in due course.
So looking at the first quote. At the start of the war the Field Squadron is an HQ and 4 Field Troops, this allows for a Field Troop to be allocated to each Cavalry Brigade, while that may seem a small amount of sappers to a Brigade Formation when you compare an Infantry Division had 2 Field Companies (later 3 Field Coys) to cover the 3 Infantry Brigades. However something that has been missed by the Author is that Field Engineering was not an unknown quantity to the Cavalry. In every Cavalry Squadron there would be 12 trained Cavalry Pioneers (9 in the Household Cavalry Squadrons)5 who had completed and passed a Field Engineering Cadre delivered by the RE Field Squadron, along side that every Cavalry Subaltan would have had a Field Engineering module included in their Troop Commanders Course – so a typical Line Cavalry Regiment would have at least 48 Cavalry pioneers trained in the following:
Crossing Rivers by improvised means and using Air raft equipment.7
Demolitions of railways and bridges.
demolition and repair of telephone lines
Construction of simple field defence works, entrenchments and loopholes.
All of this training was done in accordance with the manual of Field Engineering8.
Air raft equipment being used by the Cavalry at Aldershot pre-war with what appears to be a families day.
The part that is wrong in the first statement is the numbers in a Field Troop, while Volume 5 states 1+40 the reality is that this is the rough number for a Field Section of a RE Field Company. The Field Troop was actually 1 Officer and 30 NCOs and soldiers.
So where where might the 1+40 number come from if it’s not a mistake from the Field section? Well a very good lecture was given and written up for the RE Journal by Capt E.W. Cox RE in 1913 where he provides a lecture at the School of Military Engineering to No.3 Senior Officers Class9 with reference Field troops and their role and function with the Cavalry Divisions and Brigades. This is a really useful article with a lot of information but it does move between the Troops of the Squadron supporting the Cavalry Division and it’s Brigade, and the Field Troop that supports the Independent Cavalry Brigade. why is there a difference. This “Independent” field troop is self supporting as it has more personnel to allow for it’s own HQ, a slightly larger field troop element and a small integral Echelon. The field troop element is bigger to support a slightly larger Brigade organisation and this element is 1+40, I suspect that this may be where the Author picked up the number from.
Just to close this out as well not all Squadrons had 4 Field Troops, once fully established 1 and 2 Field Squadrons did have 4 Troops, but 3 Field Squadron operated with 3 Field Troops and both the 1st Indian Field Squadron (later renumbered 4 Field Sqn) and 2nd Indian Field Sqn (later renumbered 5 Field Sqn) each eventually had 3 Field troops.10
Moving onto the overall number in the Field Squadron (based on a 4 Troop Unit), while the Author states that it is 225 officers and Soldiers, this is an odd figure and there is only one set of figures that I have found that comes close to this number and I’m not convinced that this is how the figure was selected, but we’ll look at that in a moment.
Based on the Field Service Book 1914, the peace time and war establishment for a RE Field Squadron is 7 officers and 184 Men11.
This breaks down as follows:
Sqn HQ – 2 officers + 10 men
Field Troops x 4 – 1 Officer + 30 men each (4 officers and 120 men)
B Echelon – 1 Officer + 54 Men
So we have a full strength RE Field Squadron of 4 Field Troops of 191 personnel. this is some what short of the 225 number. The only figures that get close to this number is if you add the additional personnel of the assumed troop size of 1+40, but the establishment tables and the war diaries state that the Field Troops are 30 or less (at several points in the war Troop strength even gets as low as 18 men)
From the Field service book a RE Field Company is 11 officers and 211 men (Peace time establishment) and 6 officers and 211 men on War establishment.
The only other way that the numbers could have been made up is by taking the figures for an Indian Engineer Field Troop of 3 Officers and 56 men and multiplying that by 4 troops12, but I think this is the least likely method of calculating that figure. It is my view that the Author has use his original figure of 1 + 40 for each of the Field Troops and then added in the HQ and Echelon.
The author makes great reference to the fact that the Field Squadrons can only muster 70 men into the trenches to carry out engineering work. The author attributes this as a fact that the remainder of the Squadron is needed to look after the horses away from the Front. This reason is completely wrong and I will address this in a separate blog post as it deserves debunking, in a significant way, as it also appears as the rationale in a number of other arguments against the Cavalry as a whole. So bear with me on that point.
However I can explain and justify the figure of 70 men in the trenches. The figure of 70 men in the trenches regularly appears in 2nd Field Sqn RE war diary for Spring and early Summer 1915, it is also a figure that is briefly used for 1st Field Squadron RE in late 1914 while they are working in the trenches near Ypres. So up to this point the Corps History is correct, but we need to consider a couple of things. For the Field Squadrons this is a period of change and building up and development, going from a single Field Squadron and an Independent Field Troop to 3 field squadrons, which means that at times these units have been below strength while they each became established, on occasions even loaning complete Field Troops and equipment to allow the creation of the new unit. 13
More importantly the reason that you have this type of figure is not down to the number of people available but down to how a Field Engineering unit actually works:
A RE Field unit such as a Squadron or Company is a self contained unit that can be called on to carry out Field Engineering of a variety of forms and tasks, but to do this the unit has the Field Troops as the working or task delivery unit but anyone that has worked as a sapper or with sappers knows that engineering works consumes a significant amount of Engineering and Construction Resources.
So to keep the Field Troops supplied the Squadron has an Echelon – the In-Unit Quartermaster department that holds the big stores and equipment, and deals with demanding stores from Higher formation, either for specific tasks or as it’s own holdings are issued, expended or damaged. So the 1 officer and 54 members of a Field Squadron are not in the trenches, they are demanding stores and pushing the stores down to the Field Troops on the ground or in the Trenches. As a Echelon Commander friend of mine would regularly say “No War without G4!” and it is very true of the Great War, to deliver effect Sapper units consume engineering stores.
In addition the Echelon was providing a service to the wider Cavalry Division. All formations and units used horse drawn wagons, what happens when you have a damaged cart wheel, axle or body work of your horse drawn vehicle? Units would take it to the RE Field Squadron’s Echelon where the RE Tradesmen would carry out repairs – Wheelwrights, cart-wrights, carpenters and Blacksmiths. Right across all of the unit’s war diaries you will find the references to the repair work carried out to the Cavalry Division’s horse drawn vehicles, so the statement that “, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive” is very much incorrect.
Also the Squadron HQ is not likely to be all in the trenches, the Command element may be in the trenches but the Administration element will be near but doing their job of administrating the unit particularly as it may have Field Troops with different Brigades and Divisions, and the orders from Division will need to come into a functioning HQ. So these guys are not realistically in the 70 troop numbers.
So that leaves the 4 x Field Troops. Now it is important to break down that number of 1+30 in each troop. A full strength Field Troop has 30 NCOs and men, this is made up of 23 Sappers (NCOs and Men) and 7 Drivers. The Drivers form the unit 1st line Transport and supply and it is likely that these men are not in the trenches on a permanent basis.
Why? The period that the RE Troops are in the trenches is usually between 14-30 days at a time, they are not rotating out in the same way the infantry are, these guys are working in the trenches for that full period. If they are working then they are consuming G4 Stores and they need regular resupply and that bringing forward of supplies falls to the 1st line transport and supply from the Field Troops. These guys are not sat on their arse back in the Echelon, they are bringing forward the equipment and stores ready for the next day/night of engineering tasks.
To that end with an upto strength unit you are looking at 92 NCOs and Sappers in the trenches but in the period of 1914/15 the Squardons are working working at 2 or 3 Troop strength and that is closer to the 70 figure.
Once the Cavalry Divisions are re-organised to create the Dismounted Cavalry Units for the Trenches in 1916 and 1917 what you find is that a Division can create a Dismounted Brigade – This is because a Cavalry Regiment is in man power terms half the strength of an Infantry Battalion. This is then matched by the Field Squadrons as they work on supplying a Dismounted Troop of 30 NCOs and Sappers to support a Brigade (also remember those cavalry regiments also have their Cavalry Pioneers – The RE Field Squadrons are still running these training courses and refresher courses to the Cavalry Units through out the war as well).
The last point I want to make about the 70 NCOs and Sappers that are working in the Trenches of 1914 and 1915, they are not ineffective or unproductive as the Chapter 16 Author suggests, when you read the War diaries of 1st and 2nd Field Squadrons during their time in the trenches, they are regularly supervising and managing working parties of between 700-1500 personnel which is not bad for a small unit, In my opinion that’s punching above your weight and delivering effect. But that isn’t by accident or simply being forced on the unit. This ability to manage large working parties was pointed out by Capt Cox14 as an essential skill of the Sappers and NCOs of the Field Troop, and the “Duty of Supervision” was highlighted as a requirement of the Field Troops by Sir Douglas Haig in his report on Cavalry Divisional Training of 1909.
In my view the 70 men of the Field Squadrons when dismounted and working in the trenches, are in the good old fashioned traditions of the Corps, a force multiplier and delivering a significant Engineering effect. I fully accept that they are a smaller capability compared to the 2 Field Companies (later increased to 3 Companies)in the Infantry Divisions but they are most definitely a productive and economical Sapper unit, and that 70 man dismounted unit was regularly producing Engineering Effect with Working parties of 1500 men.
OK, that’s the first of the rants over, time to catch my breath and get ready for the next one.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
4. My view is that the Author has the view that the Squadrons would have been more productive and more mobile if mounted in lorries rather than on horse back. while the British Army at the time was embracing mechanisation more than the other armys, the all terrain capabilities of the lorry at the time was not great and the Lorry was viewed as an Logistic asset to be used at higher formation level – this will be a discussion post in the future. Also the Author does not understand the role and function of the Cavalry of the Great War. His view is that they were the “Shock of Impact” of charging horsemen, rather than the multi role capability designed to operate on the flanks, move rapidly to plug/ exploit gaps, carry out recce etc – again a topic that I will come back to in a separate blog post.
5. Colonel WH Evans DSO (1926) Brief History of the Royal Engineers with Cavalry in France During the War 1914-1918, RE Journal 1926. – this is a really good article split across 2 editions of the Journal in 1926, but it is as it suggests a brief history and while it gives some detailed info about Officers with the Squadrons it is a “Big Hand” overview. When you read this article and Chapter 16 you can see big chunks of the article lifted into the Chapter. The article gives a taste and should point you to specific areas of the war diaries.
6. Chapter 5, Section 156, Cavalry Training Manual (1915), General Staff, War Office.
7. Air raft Equipment, Section 7, Military Engineering Part 3B, Military Bridging. (1914), General Staff, War Office
8. Manual of Field Engineering (1911), General Staff, War Office.
9. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
10. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
11. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 12 – War Establishments of Various Units, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
12. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 13 India -Cavalry Brigade, War Establishments, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
13. Page 21, 25th Sep 1914, 1st Field Squadron War Diary, – 4 Field Troop and Equipment detached temporarily from 1 Field Squadron RE to help form 2nd Field Squadron, the Troop would return at the end of October 1914.
14. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Page 156, Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
Firstly I must give an apology for the lack of posts. however I have not been idle, there has been a lot of digging into archives and war diaries and planning for the coming spring and summer while I am here in Mons.
My last blog post focused on the blowing of bridges and crossings on the canals at Mons. In that post I highlighted the first Royal Engineer fatalities of the Great War – 2Lt HW Holt RE.
2Lt Holt RE was one of the Section Commanders (a Troop Commander in modern parlance) of 56 Field Company Royal Engineers. His Section was tasked to carry out the demolition of the bridge on the Rue Des Bragnons over the Mons Canal. This crossing connected the villages of Nimy (south side of Canal) with the village of Maisieres (North side of the Canal). 56 Fd Coy RE had the problem that they were ordered to not start the demolition work on the crossings until 0600hrs on the 23rd of August, despite being in location on the 22nd August. The Company was further hindered by the limited amount of explosives that they had in their possession.
By the time the Sections of the Field Company started their work to prepare the crossings for demolition it was clear that the German Army was a lot closer that anyone expected and the eastern crossing at Obourg were actively under fire from Germans on the high ground above the crossings.
At the Rue Des Bragnons crossing 2Lt Holt and his men had started their task to install the explosives on the bridge. At this time German troops had infiltrated into the village of Maisieres, and once they had suitable number they rushed the bridge and attacked the sappers as they worked. In the melee 2Lt Holt was shot and killed and 21 NCOs and Sappers were captured.
It is interesting to note that the 56 Field Coy RE War diary states that “Lt Holt believed to be wounded”.
I also feel it is important to clarify something that often causes confusion when looking at war documents such as War Diaries, when the term casualties are used it is not just deaths, it cover a number of categories:
Dead
Wounded
Captured
Missing
There is no other indication of other wounded or killed from 56 Fd Coy RE at the time.
To the best of my knowledge Lt AF Day RE of 57 Fd Coy RE is the second Royal Engineer fatality of the Great War, he received a head injury while attempting to get onto the Nimy Railway bridge to place charges. He would wait to the rear of the bridge in the vain hope that there would be a gap in the fighting that would allow him to get back onto the bridge unfortunately he would later die of his wounds while still waiting to get back onto the bridge. Again there are no other deaths listed in the 57 Fd Coy RE War Diary for the 23 Aug 1914.
So we have 2 RE Officers listed as being wounded and killed, the thing that is interested there are 2 other Sappers that are in the Military Cemetery at St Symphorien (East side of Mons) that died on the 23 Aug 1914. It is possible that these Sappers – Spr F Johnson RE and Spr H Rodford RE may be from 59 Fd Coy RE as they list “3 sappers lost wounded”. The use of the word “lost” in the war diary would indicate that they were left behind as the unit withdrew under fire and as such it is possible that two of them died of their wounds.
Coming back to Lt Holt RE, as stated, he was killed at the bridge at Maisieres and along with the infantry that were killed in the Nimy area it appears that they were initially buried in the village of Maisieres. There is a stone plaque at the village church, St Martins, that commemorates this fact.
Plaque on the side of St Martins Church, Maisieres
St Martins Church, Maisieres.
In 1916, The German Army decided that they wanted to create a centralised Military Cemetery for the area and with the agreement of a local Belgian Landowner, Jean De Lehaie, who provided the land at no cost on the proviso that the land would be used for the dead of both sides and “were commemorated with honour”. On 6 September 1917 the cemetery was formally opened by senior German Officers and several local Belgian Dignitaries, The German also placed a large obelisk on the high ground of the site to commemorate the dead buried in the cemetery.
After the Great War, the responsibilities for the Cemetery passed to the British and the Imperial War Graves Commission. As part of this process the British/ Imperial dead had their wooden crosses replaced with headstones, The British also added the Cross of Remembrance . Also between 1924 and 1952 efforts were made to bring in the dead from many of the local grave sites. it is during this period that I believe that 2Lt Holt’s body was moved from Maisieres.
With the lack of details of other casualties/ fatalities listed in 56 & 57 Fd Coy RE War Diaries I can only surmise that Johnson and Rodford may well be 2 of the wounded that were lost from 59 Fld Coy RE. The other Sapper units involved in the fight at the Mons Canal on 23/24 Aug 1914 were 17 Field Company RE who appear to only have one death – Cpl Marsden, killed at the Ghislain Railway Bridge, and 2&3 Field Troops of the Field Squadron RE who state no losses or wounded. (However the 17 Fd Coy RE War diary does not start until 27 August 1914).
The St Symphorien Cemetery has two other Sappers buried there, one is unknown and the other is from 1919.
I have still to locate where Lt AF Day RE and Cpl Marsden RE are buried, but that may well be a good excuse to get out for a few more local walks. As part of the research for this post I’ve come across the main CWGC cemeteries but I’ve also found it has been worth looking in some of the smaller village cemeteries as there are often the odd one or two military graves in them.
So there you have a bit of a follow up post on my previous blog post. With the weather starting to get better my aim is not to get out and start looking at some of the other battle sites from a Sapper perspective.
