Chapter 16’s author makes the assertion that the RE Field Squadrons would have been more mobile and effective if they had been completely mechanised and mounted in 3 ton Motor Lorries. I’m not convinced by this so I thought that I had best look into the details. So with a lot of trawling through the war diaries and also digging into the world of logistics, it has been a fascinating bit of research and it has also highlighted quite a lot of information for later blog posts.
However the basis of this post is to take us a step further on from my last about the Authors assertion that large quantities of unit manpower was lost due to looking after the horses, In this post I’ll look at the reality of 3 Ton Lorry with the Field Squadrons and also if the Author has made a correct assessment or has he missed the mark. Below are the quotes from Chapter 16:
“Even if the cavalry had had their chance, it is difficult to imagine any possible circumstances in which their engineers, if carried in motor transport, could not have served them far better than if mounted on horses.“
“An important item in the equipment of a field squadron was the 3 ton lorry allocated in 1915 for the transport of the Divisional reserve of entrenching tools – 500 picks and shovels. At times , unfortunately only for short periods, up to thirty dismounted Sappers would be attached to a Squadron. These men could be moved by dumping the reserve tools from the lorry, and it was this possible to increase the effective value of the Squadron by about 50%. Even with this example of the results from to be obtained from their mechanical transport, the Squadrons still kept their horses, though in none of the tasks their which they were employed, as given above, where any of their horses of any use. The man is was who became the slave of the horse.“
“they were undoubtedly hampered by their horses, and the substitution of light motor lorries as a means of transport would in no way have reduced their mobility; far from it.”
Chapter 16 suggest that all squadrons had a 3 ton lorry issued to them in 1915 to carry a stores allocation of 500 shovels and picks. These were required for the use by the working parties that the Squadrons supervised.
The above information comes from Chapter 16 and is only partially correct as the war diaries of the Mounted Squadrons only show that 1st Field Squadron had this vehicle and equipment allocated to them, this was allocated to them, along with 2 Army Service Corps (ASC) drivers on the 16 February 1915. The vehicle was allocated from the Divisional Supply Column and technically they didn’t own the vehicle as it remained a Divisional Asset. The war diary makes it clear that vehicle is for moving the 500 Picks and 500 Shovels. It’s made very clear that the vehicle and drivers are not Squadron assets when the War Diary has an entry for 17 February 1915 (One day after they arrived) that the unit loses one of the ASC drivers back to the supply column.
On the 22 February 1915 the Squadron is tasked with carrying out works at Ypres and 5 Officers and 78 men are allocated the task. The war diary states these men are moved by Motor Bus, not by the attached Lorry as that would have moved the stores needed for the working parties that the sappers were about to be managing. They spend 13 days working in the trenches are were returned back to the Echelon location again by Motor Bus.
The next mention of the Tool Lorry is on the 2nd Oct 1915 when the Squadron is tasked to carry out works to reverse and repair former German Trenches to the West of Loos. The war diary states that the tool lorry moves the tools to Noyelles. It is interesting to note that this location is just over 5 miles from where the work is going to take place, this is important as it is something that I will come back to later on in this post. Either way the 70 NCOs and Sappers of the Sqn and the 1000 man working party from 1 Cavalry Division would have collected their tools from this location and then taken them to the old German Trenches that needed the work.
The Sappers and the Cavalrymen complete their works on 6 October 1915 and are moved back to their respective units by……Motor Bus! still not moving by the tool lorry.
The next time that the Tool Lorry is mentioned is 9 May 1916 when the lorry and the ASC driver rejoin the Divisional Supply Column. The war diary is very clear and uses the word “rejoin”, which suggests that it was only loaned or on attachment.
The tool lorry does come back to the Field Squadron, on the 14th April 1917 and stays with the unit for 7 days before being sent/ returned to Cavalry Corps Depot.
The last mention of the use of a Lorry by the squadron is on 17 May 1917 when 2 Officers and 32 Sappers are moved by lorry to work with Pioneers of 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigade. It doesn’t suggest that this vehicle was the tool lorry and by this time of the war it is likely that it was one of the vehicles of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) or Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) – more on these important units in a moment.
Having gone through 2, 3, 4 and 5 Field Squadron’s War Diaries there is no mention of them having a Tool Lorry as 1st Field Squadron had. The diaries do mention being moved forward by lorries and buses but there is no indication that they are in unit elements.
So the Lorry was only with one Mounted Sapper Squadron, was not there for the whole war, it is referred to as the “Tool Lorry” and remained a Divisional (or higher) Supply asset.
However there is a bigger issue that has been ignored by the author. I believe that he has been looking at the the Great war situation with a WW2 perspective. The assertion that the Squadrons would have been far more mobile if mounted in lorries doesn’t hold up. There is a problem with this as the the vehicle of 1914-18 was significantly different to the vehicles of 1939-45.
Bear with me as I delve into this in more detail…….
Prior to the Great War the British Army was keen to look at how it could utilise the the Internal Combustion Engine vehicle as Motor transport for both logistics and troop movements. A number of pre-war exercises showed some real results, the exercises also identified some of the limitations of the vehicles as well. It was recognised that the Steam Engine while slow did deliver power and towing capability, the petrol engine was quicker and while developing quickly was still limited in it’s power capability.
The British Army entered the war with a significant amount of Motor Vehicles, especially compared to other armies of other nations. The Omnibus had been used in the pre-war exercises and had proved to be very useful and efficient, as the war progresses the BEF saw how the French Army used buses to transport troops. This resulted in the creation in 1916 of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) at Division Level and the Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) units at Corps level. These units used both buses and Lorries in the Troop Transporting roles.
The AOC and AOP of the Army Service Corps were a highly regarded asset, often praised by the Quarter Master General (QMG) and the Commander in Chief (CinC). They could move an Infantry Division incredibly Efficiently. However as a Division and Corps level asset they tended to move Battalion level units as a minimum.
The important thing to bear in mind with the Lorry, both in terms of stores and troop movements was that of the Off road capability. The Lorry of the Great War was confined to use on hardened roads. They did provide an essential capability normally from the rail heads down to Division and Brigade Echelons where horse transport would take over.
There was several factors that limited the Internal Combustion Engine Wheeled Motor transport to the hardened roads the main factors were:
- Poor Mechanical reliability (this did improve through the war)
- Hard Rubber tyres and wheels – pneumatic tyres burst regularly and while having a better ride quality they tended to be mainly used with the Motor Ambulances.
- Limited engine power
- Poor suspension.
Overall the ability to drive off road even in good conditions was just not viable. A lorry mounted unit allocated to support a Cavalry unit would simply not be able to keep up or follow it and considering two of the field troops principle tasks was to create Cavalry tracks and to carry out Engineer Reconnaissance, it would not be able to cross the ground that it was required to create or understand. An interesting case where this is illustrated is with Tanks, a vehicle designed to travel across country, needed to be refuelled by a 3 ton lorry with 2 gallon petrol cans but the Lorries couldn’t keep up or travel over the broken ground this resulted in the creation of tracked supply carriers (after the towed supply sledge concept proved unworkable).
The Lorry was principally a Line of Communication asset, and you need to consider the amount of works that was carried out by RE Army Troops and Labour units on road improvements and development to see how essential these were to keep the Wheeled Motor Transport (WMT) moving.
It is also interesting to note that the Geddes Report by Sir Eric Geddes in 1916 recommended that narrow gauge railway would be far more efficient at pushing logistics forward into the Combat Zone rather than Wheeled Motor Transport.
The quantity of WMT increased significantly during the war but it must also be remembered that the BEF was also increasing in manpower at the same time and a large part of that increase was the logistical tail to support the growing combat units. The “so what?” of this was that the BEF needed the vast majority of these vehicles for the movement of stores in the Line Of Communication (LOC) area and did not have the capacity to allocate these vehicles to individual units even if it wanted to.
The WMT had it’s prime role in the LOC zone and the Squadrons were lucky to have the use of a 3 Ton Lorry, but it must be remembered that the allocated vehicle was for stores movement not for troops, therefore it fits with the general principle use of the WMT in the BEF.
Despite the Author’s repeated statement that the Horse mounted Sapper was hindered by his horse (which is not the case) the unit would have been even more limited if it had been vehicle mounted, the limitation to hard roads would have stopped them providing support to most forward units let alone the staying with the cavalry.
There is always the argument that the use of more lorries would have reduced the vast quantities of fodder and feed needed by the Cavalry to sustain their Horses and Mules in the field, but the very same problem exists for these early motor vehicles – they consumed lots of petrol, which needed to be refined and shipped (also there was competing priorities between WMT and Aeroplanes for appropriate quantities of fuel), and they also consumed lots of spare parts due to their mechanical reliability. It would only be into the 1920s when the Internal combustion engine would become more reliable, more powerful and vehicle tyres and suspension would be improved enough to start dealing with driving off road in a better way.
Based on these factors it is my opinion that the Author of Chapter 16 has done a disservice to Corps and the Great War RE Field Squadrons. The Lorry of the Great War was a big leap forward in technology and a brilliant asset for the Army, and the British Army was leading the way with it’s implementation and use but the Quantity of vehicles was not enough to allocated to sub units permanently, The off road capability just didn’t exist at this time and the reliability had to be carefully managed. It just was not ready to fill the role and function with the RE Field Squadrons at this point in history, 20 years later it would be a very different story and you can see why the RE Mounted units ceased in 1937, to be replaced by Lorry mounted troops.
While the Unit War diaries have been useful as ever, one of the biggest references that I used for back ground research was Clem Maginniss’s “An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the BEF on the Western Front 1914-1918”. Lots of good Logistics information and the Corps features a lot in it, A very useful book.
In one of my next posts on Correcting/ Challenging Chapter 16, I will deal with the assertion from the Author that no engineering task could or were carried out from Horseback by the RE Field Squadrons, I have a lot of ammunition for that one……and will look at a variety of examples.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
3. http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk – An excellent site for information on the Great War.
4. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
5. Clem MaGinniss, (2018), An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918, Helion & Company
6. Sir Eric Geddes, 1916, Preliminary Statement of Personnel necessary to carry out Light Railway Recommendations of the Commander in Chief, TNA WO 32/5145