So yesterday I posted on Twitter about a project that I’ve had for a while and I’ve finally managed to make time to clean it up and it’s ready for display and possibly for use. I’m going to go through it step by step so bear with me and let me know what you think.
This an Officers private purchase mess tin. It has a registered pattern number that dates between 10 Jul 1914 and 24 Nov 1914. Now that doesn’t mean that it is a Great War item but it mean the design was registered at this point in time and is period appropriate.
Inside the cotton cover you can see the mess tin set. The cover is held in place with a plain leather strap, which isn’t in too bad a condition. The cover also closes with a small light push stud.
The set is formed with a deep pan and a lid that will act as a frying pan. Take the lid off and you can see a small kettle, a handle for both the Pan and Frying pan.
Underneath the kettle is an aluminium plate. Everything sits together very nicely in pot.
Take the lid of the kettle and you have a cup and some lose items. While the cup looks like it has a lid this isn’t the case.
The cup contains these 2 items.
it’s a bit of an odd one to work out what they are until you realise that one of the items is actually upside down.
What we have is a cooker and a small fuel can. My gut feeling is that this may well be a mentholated spirits burner, its about the same size as my old tranga cooker that I would use for wild camping.
Now the 3 arms are added and hey presto a small cooker ready to go for making a brew or doing a bit of bacon.
The last piece is to finish the set and that is to add the handle to the cup.
Slot in the bottom of the handle into the bottom bracket and then press down and slot the top into the top bracket. Job done!
And just to show the pan handle in use.
Overall a very nice period mess set for the Officer in the Field. I just need to keep an eye out for a campaign Knife Fork Spoon Set and then job done. It fits nicely with my Officer’s Field Kit, and will live in my musette bag with my whisky flask, and other essentials.
As many of you know I sport a fairly large Tashe and in most units that I have worked with over the years my facial hair is better known that I am:
“Have you seen the Garrison Engineer?”
“Who?”
“Bloke with the big Moustache?”
“Oh him, yes, he’s over at the HQ Building…..”
In recent years there has been much debate in the British Military about if we should allow beards and how that will increase recruitment and it will make the British military better.
Will it? is it the simple solution that will solve everything? is it the panacea that we need to fix everything?
No it isn’t, lets not kid ourselves there are far bigger and deeper problems than just letting the military stop shaving and becoming more hipster. I’m going to throw some thoughts and observations out there, they are my views and as such you can agree or disagree that’s your choice but just hear me out. The one argument that will not appear is the “Respirator” issue – I don’t care on that one and that can be discussed by others to their hearts content.
So lets start with my facial hair background. I’ve been in the Sappers for 36 years and I have had facial hair of various forms for 28 years of my career. There has been the occasional short breaks in that period but normally no greater than 4 months as the maximum. During my facial hair career I have done the following:
Shaved my tashe off once due to operational necessity. (Norther Ireland)
Shaved my tashe off once as I was required (ordered)to give an order for others to shave off their “tour” tashes and I could not give that order when I retained my tashe (on the grounds that my tashe was a “tour” tashe from 15 years prior). Our clean shaven status lasted about 10 days and we started growing facial hair again.
Shaved my tashe off due to a misconceived understanding of an order about the removal of “Movember Tashes”, this resulted in myself and another GE removing our long worn Facial hair and there truely becoming 2 x “Grumpy Engineers” knocking about the unit. This also resulted in the 2 Garrison Engineers receiving orders from higher formations (Our Wives) that we were not to return from Tour without our moustaches.
My wife has always liked me having a tashe, even to the point that she saw a photo of me from a Falklands Tour in 98 where I was sporting something that would not have been out of place in 1982 Goose Green with her comment of “that really suits you, can you grow it like that?” .
Wedding day to the GOC UKLF – Please note we are the same height, I’m just stood on a step for the photo!
My unaccompanied posting to Cyprus for 2 years saw me some what rebel and go back to a time when I joined the army and quite a lot of SNCOs had tashes and facial hair “buggeryboards” on the cheeks, so my tashe became some what bigger and more substantial.
Cyprus 2005-7, the development of the enlarged tashe of colonial proportions.
Wearing a serious look of concentration and a large tashe in a show jumping competition.
Now all of this is all very well but I want to add an important note, that will be relevant in a short while. My very first attempt to grow a tashe was on tour in 1990 as a young Sapper. It took 6 weeks to be noticed by anyone and it was clear that I was not ready to have facial hair.
A young tasheless pup lurking in the hedges and ditches of Northern Ireland
So back to my thoughts on the facial hair. when I joined in 1987 most of my Training Sgts and Trade Sgts all had tashes, they were long in the tooth experienced blokes who had been to Northern Ireland, The Falklands War or had spent their time in Germany waiting for the 3rd Shock Army to roll over the inner German Border. Not many of the Officers had tashes and if they did they tended to be the Late Entry Officers, not the blue bloods. Facial hair in the Army of that time was a fairly common sight.
Years later I chatted with a OC that I worked with closely and asked why most officers didn’t wear tashes and he put it down to being traumatised by Walrus Tashed Colour Sgts and Sgt Majors while at Sandhurst. He may well have had a point!
The Moustache used to be compulsory in the British Army until the rescinding of Kings Regulation 1695 in 1916, this was brought about by General Macready. I used to have a problem with this chap until you dig into his history and his work in Ireland is a real insight, the fact that he hated having a moustache is something that we may need to just keep in the back of our mind when we look at the discussion about beards, they are not going to be everyone’s taste.
So the discussion is that we should allow beards, well I think that is a fair point and I don’t have a problem “having beards”. However (you knew there would be a however….) we (the Army) need to think this through, because the RAF clearly did not.
What do I mean by this. When the RAF changed the rules I was doing regular visits to Northwood for meetings and it was clear that most male RAF Officers below Wing Commander where now having a crack at growing beards, and my observation is that the Royal Navy and Army staff officers were clearly enjoying watching the really bad and poor efforts that were being cultivated by their light blue brethren . Some of the people working with these guys should have taken them to one side and said “you’ve had a couple of months of this, it just isn’t working, shave it off sunshine until you get a bit more testosterone…”
This is what happened with my very first effort, I just wasn’t ready for it, it would take 5 more years before I was “mature” enough to start growing facial hair.
My view on this is – just because you are allowed doesn’t mean that you should!
Next, I have not seen any beards in the RAF (with an exception that I will talk about in a moment) that have an element of style other than plain trimmed or clipper graded. These beards seem to lack body or style. Come on Guys, they gave you the opportunity to have a beard now damn well make an effort! At the moment it just looks like you have a beard because you can’t be arse to shave and now that you have it you can’t be arse to do some proper care and maintenance other than get it clippered.
If you are in the RAF and you have a beard then take a leaf out of the efforts done by your Sikh brethren, they show you how to wear a beard. I have chatted regularly with Sikhs to understand the meaning and customs of their facial hair and beards, and it is important to them and they have some bloody impressive sets of whiskers. So if you are going to have a beard then learn from these fine chaps, build up that tashe and get a curl in it, add body and substance to the beard itself and damn well invest in some beard products such as beard oil! I appreciate that it takes time but you need to invest time and effort into it. If you are going to have a beard then bloody well have a beard and be damned proud of it!
Warrant Officer Balbir Flora and 2 newly commissioned RAF Officers.
Now what about the Army, well we have something the RAF doesn’t have. We have a history of beards in the British Army, the Victorian period was awash with the Facial Hair of the British Army expanding the Empire.
Sergeant Major Edwards 1858
In some parts it was the practicalities of Campaigning, the military fashion of the time or to match (and exceed) the facial hair of the Martial Tribes, Clans or Races that we fought against or fought along side. The moustaches and beards of the Army had a lot of meaning.
For me if we are going to allow beards then lets get back to the Historical links and the precedents, standards and styles. Don’t be distracted by the “hipster” style, lets give the beard and tashe that Regimental Identity, give it Tradition, give it a place in the Regiment History.
Make it the “The British Army Beard” not some facial fluff of a soy latte drinking twat with a fecking top knot! (if that upset you – why are you here on this blog? )
Right I’ll pin my colours to the mast, if beards come in prior to the end of my service then I’m going for this style as worn by Lord Roberts and Lord Chelmsford. Side boards extended, sweep round the jaw line and linking in with a full tashe with a waxed curl to it. Throat and chin clean shaven.
Now that facial accoutrements will need care and attention to grow, mature and maintain. My current tashe attracts attention and comments as I move around the multi nation environment as it is, this badger is going to knock my existing tashe for 6. I’d say that style may meet the requirements for a British Army Beard! what are your thoughts?
But regiments can make their own styles, we saw this in the Raj where different regiments would have a style. Did the Army follow the style of society or did society follow the style of the Army?
I know that the Army in India did it to match or be comparable with those that they had dealings with so that they would be on par with the society and the environment they were engaged with.
So my question is “are we, the Army, are going to allow Beards?” and if so what rules are going to be applied? We already have a set of rules for moustaches, how do we develop the rules for beards?
Ask permission to grow?
28 days to grow enough to show clear intent and substance?
Inspection by the CSM/ SSM at 21 Days to see that its going in the right direction.
Well trimmed, uniformed length?
what styles are forbidden? Braided Pagan?
What styles are allowed – Jan Smuts Goatee perhaps?
Beard oils and Tashe Wax?
Regimental preferences perhaps?
Does it come as an optional privilege of rank or time in unit?
I will say that what ever happens it should not be compulsory. Facial Hair comes and goes from fashion in society. And the wearer should at least commit to putting the effort in and not just use it as an excuse to not bother to shave.
I’ve worked with several other forces and you can see some of them put the effort in (the French and Scandinavians) and for some other forces it is just a token effort that does look pretty poor on the soldier and the unit (you know who you are you scruffy wretches…..!).
Allowing beards will not solve recruitment as it will come with responsibilities for a soldier to look after it and to get it right, there will be very few recruits that will arrive with it right on day one and may end up getting it shaved off along with the trendy hair cut that they arrive with. Also while in training a recruit has enough on their plate to get through an inspection without having their beard inspected – How many recruits arrive at the training depot with a decent tashe – not many I would say.
However once an individual is in a unit why not aim for developing the famous beard style of your particular Regiment or Corps? Join the 1st Battalion Blankshire Rifles – The Fighting Walrus Tashes or the Mad Ginger Beards of 3rd Battalion Royal Highland Lunatics.
The army is pretty good at accommodating different cultural and religious traditions and has made some sensible changes for women’s hair, so I think we can embrace the allowing of beards but lets do it by accommodating and using the cultural facial hair traditions that the British Army had previously and not be blinkered by some modern fad when we already had the answer!
Its just my thoughts……I will leave you with Field Marshal Sir John Linton Simmons of the Corps of Royal Engineers and his exceptionally fine set of Military Whiskers!
So a couple of months ago I was contacted by a good mate, Andy Smerdon, he was having a clear out of some of his old kit as he had down sized and as he is now living on a boat. He had come across a Royal Engineers Riding Crop that he had forgotten about and thought that I would be the ideal person to have it.
We’ll as much as I already have a RE riding crop, I’m not one to turn down such a great offer, so I said yes and Andy said he would post it onto my home address.
My RE whip is very similar to the one carried in this photo, silver topped with the RE cap badge on it.
I was expecting the whip to be very similar to the one that I already have, a long thin whip as carried by Sappers and Drivers and often used in place of a walking out cane that Sappers of non mounted units were fond of. What actually arrived was some what different and real surprise.
What actually turned up was a horn handled hunting whip, in very good condition, with 2 silver collars on it. I use a similar type of whip when I do Living History as an RE Officer as it fits the image and is quite common in photos of the time.
I had a good look at the whip to find out what made it a RE related item?
It was one of the first prizes at the Mounted Sports event held at the Engineer Training Centre (ETC) at Newark in 1916 and it was the 1st prize for the Officers Jumping Event. The event was won by DC Lovick RE.
I decide that I would try and find out who DC Lovick RE was and perhaps to see if I could find out what happened to him. So a quick search of the National Archives allowed me to find this chap’s Medal Card. And it seems that he was a 2Lt in 1916, and was promoted Captain.
I now know his name is Donald Currie Lovick, and he deployed to France in November 1916, he is awarded the British war medal and I can make out some writing in the Victory Medal box.
I decided to just do a check to see if he survived the war, since I still had my ancestry account, as I use it to research my family tree, I went looking for any information that might suggest if he survived. The initial search throw up around 113 records for the name Lovick, but the Donald Currie really narrowed it down.
The first thing found was a birth registry for 1885/1886, born in Aylsham Norfolk – was he 40 years old when he enlisted and became and Officer, while it isn’t unheard of, it is unusual? time to dig a bit more.
I find his death is registered in January 1962, aged 86, in Maldon Essex, so it initially appears that he is still in and around the East Anglia area.
The next thing that appeared was our Donald Lovick appears on the list of members of a Freemason Lodge. This isn’t unusual for the period where freemasonry was a popular activity across Britain and the Empire. What surprised me was the Lodge that he was a member of Lodge 1331 Aldershot Camp Lodge, having been listed as joining in 1903. That is mainly a Military Lodge and also what is an East Anglian man doing in Aldershot in 1903? Has he been in the Army before? Time to continue digging.
Checking the census for 1911 starts to throw more light on things. Donald Currie Lovick has served before and is listed as a Quartermaster Sergeant Royal Engineers at the School of Military Engineering, Brompton Barracks, Chatham. On the census it lists his trade as Storekeeper.
Donald is listed at line 20
This suggests that Donald has now been commissioned from the ranks sometime between 1911 and 1916 and I now start to wonder if he has been commissioned as a Quartermaster or as a unit officer, considering at the time both would have been given the rank of 2Lt. This now explains why we have a 40 year old man at a Training Depot in 1916. Also ETC Newark was a training Depot for Soldiers, not for officers, so that suggests that Donald was there as part of the Staff.
The next thing to go looking for just to see what Donald’s earlier service was and the 1901 census start to give more detail for me. In 1901 Donald is in Aldershot and is a Corporal in B Troop of the Bridging Battalion Royal Engineers, we have a Mounted Sapper! The census states that all those listed in the census book are part of the Royal Engineers Mounted and Imperial Yeomanry in Aldershot.
This would now explain why a 40 year old crusty 2Lt has won first prize in the Officer Sports Event at Newark in 1916, probably beating some of the younger bloods. This old boy has been knocking around military horses for a bit of time!
I can’t find any entries for Donald in the 1891 census when he would have been 15 or 16. It may be that he was already enlisted and serving as a boy soldier but I can’t see any information on that. Also I don’t have access to his Service Records.
The last bit of information that I have from 1939 about our Donald is that he was living in Maldon, Essex and was listed on councils register as “Captain RE Retired” and that he is listed as a School of Military Engineering Instructor. Does this suggest that Donald went back to the SME at Chatham after the war? This is something that I’d like to try and dig a bit deeper into and may be a project for later this year.
Either way this has been an interesting research job, to now know that I have a very nice riding whip won and carried by a Late Entry Mounted Sapper. I’d like to know a bit more about Captain Donald Currie Lovick RE, but for the moment what I have found it isn’t a bad bit of history from being gifted a riding crop that my mate was clearing out.
Chapter 16’s author makes the assertion that the RE Field Squadrons would have been more mobile and effective if they had been completely mechanised and mounted in 3 ton Motor Lorries. I’m not convinced by this so I thought that I had best look into the details. So with a lot of trawling through the war diaries and also digging into the world of logistics, it has been a fascinating bit of research and it has also highlighted quite a lot of information for later blog posts.
However the basis of this post is to take us a step further on from my last about the Authors assertion that large quantities of unit manpower was lost due to looking after the horses, In this post I’ll look at the reality of 3 Ton Lorry with the Field Squadrons and also if the Author has made a correct assessment or has he missed the mark. Below are the quotes from Chapter 16:
“Even if the cavalry had had their chance, it is difficult to imagine any possible circumstances in which their engineers, if carried in motor transport, could not have served them far better than if mounted on horses.“
“An important item in the equipment of a field squadron was the 3 ton lorry allocated in 1915 for the transport of the Divisional reserve of entrenching tools – 500 picks and shovels. At times , unfortunately only for short periods, up to thirty dismounted Sappers would be attached to a Squadron. These men could be moved by dumping the reserve tools from the lorry, and it was this possible to increase the effective value of the Squadron by about 50%. Even with this example of the results from to be obtained from their mechanical transport, the Squadrons still kept their horses, though in none of the tasks their which they were employed, as given above, where any of their horses of any use. The man is was who became the slave of the horse.“
“they were undoubtedly hampered by their horses, and the substitution of light motor lorries as a means of transport would in no way have reduced their mobility; far from it.”
Chapter 16 suggest that all squadrons had a 3 ton lorry issued to them in 1915 to carry a stores allocation of 500 shovels and picks. These were required for the use by the working parties that the Squadrons supervised.
The above information comes from Chapter 16 and is only partially correct as the war diaries of the Mounted Squadrons only show that 1st Field Squadron had this vehicle and equipment allocated to them, this was allocated to them, along with 2 Army Service Corps (ASC) drivers on the 16 February 1915. The vehicle was allocated from the Divisional Supply Column and technically they didn’t own the vehicle as it remained a Divisional Asset. The war diary makes it clear that vehicle is for moving the 500 Picks and 500 Shovels. It’s made very clear that the vehicle and drivers are not Squadron assets when the War Diary has an entry for 17 February 1915 (One day after they arrived) that the unit loses one of the ASC drivers back to the supply column.
On the 22 February 1915 the Squadron is tasked with carrying out works at Ypres and 5 Officers and 78 men are allocated the task. The war diary states these men are moved by Motor Bus, not by the attached Lorry as that would have moved the stores needed for the working parties that the sappers were about to be managing. They spend 13 days working in the trenches are were returned back to the Echelon location again by Motor Bus.
The next mention of the Tool Lorry is on the 2nd Oct 1915 when the Squadron is tasked to carry out works to reverse and repair former German Trenches to the West of Loos. The war diary states that the tool lorry moves the tools to Noyelles. It is interesting to note that this location is just over 5 miles from where the work is going to take place, this is important as it is something that I will come back to later on in this post. Either way the 70 NCOs and Sappers of the Sqn and the 1000 man working party from 1 Cavalry Division would have collected their tools from this location and then taken them to the old German Trenches that needed the work.
The Sappers and the Cavalrymen complete their works on 6 October 1915 and are moved back to their respective units by……Motor Bus! still not moving by the tool lorry.
The next time that the Tool Lorry is mentioned is 9 May 1916 when the lorry and the ASC driver rejoin the Divisional Supply Column. The war diary is very clear and uses the word “rejoin”, which suggests that it was only loaned or on attachment.
The tool lorry does come back to the Field Squadron, on the 14th April 1917 and stays with the unit for 7 days before being sent/ returned to Cavalry Corps Depot.
The last mention of the use of a Lorry by the squadron is on 17 May 1917 when 2 Officers and 32 Sappers are moved by lorry to work with Pioneers of 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigade. It doesn’t suggest that this vehicle was the tool lorry and by this time of the war it is likely that it was one of the vehicles of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) or Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) – more on these important units in a moment.
Having gone through 2, 3, 4 and 5 Field Squadron’s War Diaries there is no mention of them having a Tool Lorry as 1st Field Squadron had. The diaries do mention being moved forward by lorries and buses but there is no indication that they are in unit elements.
So the Lorry was only with one Mounted Sapper Squadron, was not there for the whole war, it is referred to as the “Tool Lorry” and remained a Divisional (or higher) Supply asset.
However there is a bigger issue that has been ignored by the author. I believe that he has been looking at the the Great war situation with a WW2 perspective. The assertion that the Squadrons would have been far more mobile if mounted in lorries doesn’t hold up. There is a problem with this as the the vehicle of 1914-18 was significantly different to the vehicles of 1939-45.
Bear with me as I delve into this in more detail…….
Prior to the Great War the British Army was keen to look at how it could utilise the the Internal Combustion Engine vehicle as Motor transport for both logistics and troop movements. A number of pre-war exercises showed some real results, the exercises also identified some of the limitations of the vehicles as well. It was recognised that the Steam Engine while slow did deliver power and towing capability, the petrol engine was quicker and while developing quickly was still limited in it’s power capability.
The British Army entered the war with a significant amount of Motor Vehicles, especially compared to other armies of other nations. The Omnibus had been used in the pre-war exercises and had proved to be very useful and efficient, as the war progresses the BEF saw how the French Army used buses to transport troops. This resulted in the creation in 1916 of the Auxiliary Omnibus Companies (AOC) at Division Level and the Auxiliary Omnibus Park (AOP) units at Corps level. These units used both buses and Lorries in the Troop Transporting roles.
The AOC and AOP of the Army Service Corps were a highly regarded asset, often praised by the Quarter Master General (QMG) and the Commander in Chief (CinC). They could move an Infantry Division incredibly Efficiently. However as a Division and Corps level asset they tended to move Battalion level units as a minimum.
The important thing to bear in mind with the Lorry, both in terms of stores and troop movements was that of the Off road capability. The Lorry of the Great War was confined to use on hardened roads. They did provide an essential capability normally from the rail heads down to Division and Brigade Echelons where horse transport would take over.
There was several factors that limited the Internal Combustion Engine Wheeled Motor transport to the hardened roads the main factors were:
Poor Mechanical reliability (this did improve through the war)
Hard Rubber tyres and wheels – pneumatic tyres burst regularly and while having a better ride quality they tended to be mainly used with the Motor Ambulances.
Limited engine power
Poor suspension.
A good image showing the solid tyres and suspension of a typical 3 ton truck
Ambulances tended to have pneumatic tyres to make the ride easier for the casualties.
Overall the ability to drive off road even in good conditions was just not viable. A lorry mounted unit allocated to support a Cavalry unit would simply not be able to keep up or follow it and considering two of the field troops principle tasks was to create Cavalry tracks and to carry out Engineer Reconnaissance, it would not be able to cross the ground that it was required to create or understand. An interesting case where this is illustrated is with Tanks, a vehicle designed to travel across country, needed to be refuelled by a 3 ton lorry with 2 gallon petrol cans but the Lorries couldn’t keep up or travel over the broken ground this resulted in the creation of tracked supply carriers (after the towed supply sledge concept proved unworkable).
Armoured Supply Carrier
The Lorry was principally a Line of Communication asset, and you need to consider the amount of works that was carried out by RE Army Troops and Labour units on road improvements and development to see how essential these were to keep the Wheeled Motor Transport (WMT) moving.
It is also interesting to note that the Geddes Report by Sir Eric Geddes in 1916 recommended that narrow gauge railway would be far more efficient at pushing logistics forward into the Combat Zone rather than Wheeled Motor Transport.
The quantity of WMT increased significantly during the war but it must also be remembered that the BEF was also increasing in manpower at the same time and a large part of that increase was the logistical tail to support the growing combat units. The “so what?” of this was that the BEF needed the vast majority of these vehicles for the movement of stores in the Line Of Communication (LOC) area and did not have the capacity to allocate these vehicles to individual units even if it wanted to.
The WMT had it’s prime role in the LOC zone and the Squadrons were lucky to have the use of a 3 Ton Lorry, but it must be remembered that the allocated vehicle was for stores movement not for troops, therefore it fits with the general principle use of the WMT in the BEF.
Despite the Author’s repeated statement that the Horse mounted Sapper was hindered by his horse (which is not the case) the unit would have been even more limited if it had been vehicle mounted, the limitation to hard roads would have stopped them providing support to most forward units let alone the staying with the cavalry.
There is always the argument that the use of more lorries would have reduced the vast quantities of fodder and feed needed by the Cavalry to sustain their Horses and Mules in the field, but the very same problem exists for these early motor vehicles – they consumed lots of petrol, which needed to be refined and shipped (also there was competing priorities between WMT and Aeroplanes for appropriate quantities of fuel), and they also consumed lots of spare parts due to their mechanical reliability. It would only be into the 1920s when the Internal combustion engine would become more reliable, more powerful and vehicle tyres and suspension would be improved enough to start dealing with driving off road in a better way.
Based on these factors it is my opinion that the Author of Chapter 16 has done a disservice to Corps and the Great War RE Field Squadrons. The Lorry of the Great War was a big leap forward in technology and a brilliant asset for the Army, and the British Army was leading the way with it’s implementation and use but the Quantity of vehicles was not enough to allocated to sub units permanently, The off road capability just didn’t exist at this time and the reliability had to be carefully managed. It just was not ready to fill the role and function with the RE Field Squadrons at this point in history, 20 years later it would be a very different story and you can see why the RE Mounted units ceased in 1937, to be replaced by Lorry mounted troops.
While the Unit War diaries have been useful as ever, one of the biggest references that I used for back ground research was Clem Maginniss’s “An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the BEF on the Western Front 1914-1918”. Lots of good Logistics information and the Corps features a lot in it, A very useful book.
In one of my next posts on Correcting/ Challenging Chapter 16, I will deal with the assertion from the Author that no engineering task could or were carried out from Horseback by the RE Field Squadrons, I have a lot of ammunition for that one……and will look at a variety of examples.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
4. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
5. Clem MaGinniss, (2018), An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour – Logistics and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918, Helion & Company
6. Sir Eric Geddes, 1916, Preliminary Statement of Personnel necessary to carry out Light Railway Recommendations of the Commander in Chief, TNA WO 32/5145
The next point that I need to address from Chapter 16 of the Corps History is that the Author attributes the lack of available manpower available for tasking is the fact that the majority of the Squadron’s personnel were occupied with looking after the horses when dismounted.
Blogger’s Note – In cavalry terms – a section relates to 4 mounted riders and a half section is 2 mounted riders, mounted units would move either by section or half section columns.
This post is linked with the numbers of 70 NCOs and Sappers being available for working in the Trenches. The author has picked on the fact that when a mounted unit dismounts 1 man in every 4 would remain mounted, gather up the reins of the other 3 horses and lead them away to a safe point/ safe area. This is the comment from Chapter 16:
“Acting as field companies when their divisions were dismounted and sent into the the line. A cavalry division could produce about 1200 rifles and a field squadron at most seventy men to go with them. Small though these numbers may appear, they meant that each man left behind had at least four horses to look after.“
I have already justified the 70 men number but I want to look specifically at the “1 in 4” misconception. As stated above it was true that when a Mounted unit dismounts 1 man of each Mounted section (a 4 man team) would stay mounted and ride away with the horses. This is described clearly in the Cavalry Training Manual of 1915, Section 153 and Section 213, this states that the No3 Rider of the section would remain mounted, take the reins of the other 3 horses (2 on his left and one on his right) and lead them to a specified rear area. It is also stated in the Cavalry Regulations of 1907 (Sect 106).
Image from WW2 but clearly shows the principle of No3 Rider moving the horses away at pace to a safe rear area
Kings Troop RHA still use the same principles and skills today to exercise their horses while using minimal personnel
mules left tied on a picket line with their nose bags
To make this even more RE Field Squadron specific, Mounted Sappers were required to be trained to Mounted Infantry Standards and the governing manual was the Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training Manual of 1912 and the relevant sections for dismounted action and leading horses was Section 108 and Section 149. These regulations all match.
So the Chapter 16 Author is right?…..Err….No, no he isn’t, he completely has misunderstood the 1 in 4 rule.
Everything that is quoted above related to riding into combat (advance to contact if you will) and then the unit dismounts to fight. This isn’t about going into the trenches (into the line). If the squadron was going into the Trenches then the horses would be back with the Echelon and in Horse Lines – I’ll talk about this later in this post.
Horse Holders of 4 ALH
But coming back to the dismounted combat, with the horses ridden back to safe area the No 3 rider would dismount and manage the horses dismounted. If more men were required on the firing line then the man of every second section would go forward, leaving one man with 8 horses (possibly bringing forward the extra ammunition bandoliers that were hanging round each horses neck). So in theory for a full strength Field Troop of 1 officer and 23 Sappers (remember that 7 drivers are with the Troop GS wagon and Troop Tool Cart) would only require 3 horse holders not the 6 suggested.
So that is in the field, under fire, so what about when the unit went forward into the Trenches?
Well the unit horses would be held at the Echelon location or at a Brigade Cavalry Lines and these locations would not require the loss of a man in every 4. Horses that are held in a rear area would be held on a picqueted line or in more formal horse lines and this would allow for the horses to be tied onto the horse line and then managed by a small number of men. the management of picqueted horses and horse lines is very clearly laid out in the horse management manuals and the Light Horse Pocket Book of the Australian Light Horse (ALH) explains the horse lines duties very clearly:
4 ALH horse lines in Egypt
Page 49 – Day Stable Picquet
1 man per half Squadron (ALH Squadrons are only slightly smaller than an RE Field Squadron at 150 men) will start duty at “Morning Stables” until relieved by the Night Stable piquet.
Duties –
Keep the horse lines clean
Prevent Horses from Injuring themselves
Remove Nose Bags and make out hay ration if issued.
Make sure that all horses are quiet
Make fast any horses that get loose or draw their pegs
Replace rugs/ blankets that fall off
In the event of rain then cover over the nose bags, forage, clothing etc
Act as the horse lines sentry, prevent any smoking, and prevent unauthorised persons from entering the horse lines.
At night time this picquet is increased to a Section (NCO plus 3 men). These individuals are on one at a time on a 2 hour shift/ stag with very similar duties as the day stable piquet. The only difference is that they are to make sure that men of the squadron do not loiter around the horse lines.
These duties and details are standard for British and Imperial mounted units.
A well established and set up rear area horse lines.
Therefore it can be seen that when a RE mounted unit has it’s horses in the horse lines then you are looking at 2 men during the day from the Squadron total,( field Troops and echelon) and then at night this would go upto 8 men. In all of these situations these are the maximum figures and even with the Field Troops in the trenches it is manageable from those troops of the Echelon as they would have to do these duties for their own horses anyway.
So we can see that the author of Chapter 16 is wildly incorrect in the statement that “man had become the slave of horse”.
My view is that the author has not spent time with horses but has latched onto the view that all horse management when the unit dismounts requires 1 Sapper out of 4 men to be fully employed to look after the horses, The suggestion from the author would be that the horses would require 48 men to look after them (that is almost all of the Echelon or 2 Field Troops). Hopefully I have shown that this is not the case and again I feel that the lack of actual knowledge or research by the author has allowed the Mounted Sappers of the Field Squadrons to be unfairly characterised as being inefficient and/or ineffective.
The question to ask of the Author, if the RE Field Squadrons were so inefficient and ineffective why were they expanded from one Field Squadron to five Field Squadrons (not including the Australian Field Squadrons)?
Canadian Cavalry, Possibly the Fort Garry Horse, with the Troop carrying out a Stables parade on the horse lines. This would be compulsory attendance for all men of the unit to attend to work on their horse – The Unit Adjutant and Duty Officer were not even exempt!
Bloggers Note – I want to just add that Horse and Mule Management was taken incredibly seriously by the British Army, it had learned hard lessons from the Boer War and looking after the equines was an important task. The RE Mounted Units were an important part of that process be that creating wind breaks and shelters for the temporary Horse lines in the Cavalry Holding areas or for the construction of better horse lines in the rear areas.
Please go back over this post and have a look at all of the Horse line images and look at how few men are with the horses on the line. This was a routine duty and had little impact on the manpower or effectiveness of the Field Squadrons.
In one of the future blog posts I will look at dispelling the myth that the Mounted sappers could not carry out engineering when mounted.
This will be the first of a number of blog posts over time that will look to correct some of the incorrect details and negative views put forward in The Royal Engineers History, Volume 51. So what’s my problem with this? The Field Squadrons and Field Troops have their own chapter in Volume 5, focused on the units on the Western Front, and this is Chapter 162, my problem is that it is one of the only chapters in the volume that is negative and dismissive of the works of the Sappers and Officers in the Great War. It also has been written in a way where the opinion of the Author is used more than actually stating facts or details, which is at odds with many of the other chapters that are written in a more factual way.
Now let me make this clear, I am a serving Sapper and have been for 36 years, I’m incredibly proud of my Corps history but I feel that the Field Squadrons and Troops of the Corps are being done a disservice by the Corps written history.
I did originally planned to do this as an article for the RE Journal, however the further that I dug into Volume 5 for research, then cross referenced with war diaries and other documents I realise that there was too much to try and squeeze into a 2000-3000 word article. To that end I plan to pick up on a topic area and then explore it and go through the details that I’ve found that contradicts the detail or explain what has been stated in Volume 5 and why I consider it to be incorrect or misleading.
Now I complained that the Author has stated opinion in the article, I will also be giving my opinion and some assumptions but I will aim to point them out and support/ justify them with my rationale behind my views and assumptions.
When I volunteered to take part in the War Horse Ride in 2014, I felt that I needed to understand the history of the period and the unit I was being asked to ride in memory of, and so started the research in the Mounted Sappers and my evolution/ creation of the Horseback Sapper began. I used the Corps History Volume 5 as my first point of call and supported by websites like the https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/ 3 . At this point I was soaking in information but it was only from 2016 onwards when armed with more information that I started to see the negative side of Chapter 16. With further research and more time spent in the unit war diaries and in the articles in the RE Journal I started to see that the research for the chapter was only surface deep and seemed to lack some of the knowledge of someone that served with the Field Sqns in the Great War, and my suspicion was that they may not have served in the Great War at all 4, the author uses large elements of Colonel WH Evens DSO RE Journal article from 1926 5. Indeed Volume 5 lists all of the people that helped in the production of the Great War Volumes but it doesn’t attribute who wrote what chapters. I’ve even asked the Institution of Royal Engineers and the RE Historical Society if they have the details about who wrote each chapter and unfortunately they don’t. I’ve even been compiling the list of officers that served with a mounted RE unit and so far none of the names appear listed in the front of Volume 5, (also bear in mind the Volume 5 was published in 1952.)
So lets focus on the first area of contention – The manning size and scale of the RE Field Squadrons.
The following are quotes from Chapter 16 of Volume 5:
“A Cavalry Division had a Field Squadron RE consisting of a HQ and 4 troops, each troop an establishment of one officer and about 40 NCOs and Men.” (page 426)
“The establishment of a Field Squadron was 225 men and the same number of horses” (page 427)
“A Field Squadron was not an economical unit. From a whole squadron it was impossible, even under favourable conditions to provide a dismounted working party of more than 70 NCOs and men, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive.” (page 427)
This last statement is repeated a number of times through the chapter and while the number is correct, the reasoning is wrong, but I’ll get to that in due course.
So looking at the first quote. At the start of the war the Field Squadron is an HQ and 4 Field Troops, this allows for a Field Troop to be allocated to each Cavalry Brigade, while that may seem a small amount of sappers to a Brigade Formation when you compare an Infantry Division had 2 Field Companies (later 3 Field Coys) to cover the 3 Infantry Brigades. However something that has been missed by the Author is that Field Engineering was not an unknown quantity to the Cavalry. In every Cavalry Squadron there would be 12 trained Cavalry Pioneers (9 in the Household Cavalry Squadrons)5 who had completed and passed a Field Engineering Cadre delivered by the RE Field Squadron, along side that every Cavalry Subaltan would have had a Field Engineering module included in their Troop Commanders Course – so a typical Line Cavalry Regiment would have at least 48 Cavalry pioneers trained in the following:
Crossing Rivers by improvised means and using Air raft equipment.7
Demolitions of railways and bridges.
demolition and repair of telephone lines
Construction of simple field defence works, entrenchments and loopholes.
All of this training was done in accordance with the manual of Field Engineering8.
Air raft equipment being used by the Cavalry at Aldershot pre-war with what appears to be a families day.
The part that is wrong in the first statement is the numbers in a Field Troop, while Volume 5 states 1+40 the reality is that this is the rough number for a Field Section of a RE Field Company. The Field Troop was actually 1 Officer and 30 NCOs and soldiers.
So where where might the 1+40 number come from if it’s not a mistake from the Field section? Well a very good lecture was given and written up for the RE Journal by Capt E.W. Cox RE in 1913 where he provides a lecture at the School of Military Engineering to No.3 Senior Officers Class9 with reference Field troops and their role and function with the Cavalry Divisions and Brigades. This is a really useful article with a lot of information but it does move between the Troops of the Squadron supporting the Cavalry Division and it’s Brigade, and the Field Troop that supports the Independent Cavalry Brigade. why is there a difference. This “Independent” field troop is self supporting as it has more personnel to allow for it’s own HQ, a slightly larger field troop element and a small integral Echelon. The field troop element is bigger to support a slightly larger Brigade organisation and this element is 1+40, I suspect that this may be where the Author picked up the number from.
Just to close this out as well not all Squadrons had 4 Field Troops, once fully established 1 and 2 Field Squadrons did have 4 Troops, but 3 Field Squadron operated with 3 Field Troops and both the 1st Indian Field Squadron (later renumbered 4 Field Sqn) and 2nd Indian Field Sqn (later renumbered 5 Field Sqn) each eventually had 3 Field troops.10
Moving onto the overall number in the Field Squadron (based on a 4 Troop Unit), while the Author states that it is 225 officers and Soldiers, this is an odd figure and there is only one set of figures that I have found that comes close to this number and I’m not convinced that this is how the figure was selected, but we’ll look at that in a moment.
Based on the Field Service Book 1914, the peace time and war establishment for a RE Field Squadron is 7 officers and 184 Men11.
This breaks down as follows:
Sqn HQ – 2 officers + 10 men
Field Troops x 4 – 1 Officer + 30 men each (4 officers and 120 men)
B Echelon – 1 Officer + 54 Men
So we have a full strength RE Field Squadron of 4 Field Troops of 191 personnel. this is some what short of the 225 number. The only figures that get close to this number is if you add the additional personnel of the assumed troop size of 1+40, but the establishment tables and the war diaries state that the Field Troops are 30 or less (at several points in the war Troop strength even gets as low as 18 men)
From the Field service book a RE Field Company is 11 officers and 211 men (Peace time establishment) and 6 officers and 211 men on War establishment.
The only other way that the numbers could have been made up is by taking the figures for an Indian Engineer Field Troop of 3 Officers and 56 men and multiplying that by 4 troops12, but I think this is the least likely method of calculating that figure. It is my view that the Author has use his original figure of 1 + 40 for each of the Field Troops and then added in the HQ and Echelon.
The author makes great reference to the fact that the Field Squadrons can only muster 70 men into the trenches to carry out engineering work. The author attributes this as a fact that the remainder of the Squadron is needed to look after the horses away from the Front. This reason is completely wrong and I will address this in a separate blog post as it deserves debunking, in a significant way, as it also appears as the rationale in a number of other arguments against the Cavalry as a whole. So bear with me on that point.
However I can explain and justify the figure of 70 men in the trenches. The figure of 70 men in the trenches regularly appears in 2nd Field Sqn RE war diary for Spring and early Summer 1915, it is also a figure that is briefly used for 1st Field Squadron RE in late 1914 while they are working in the trenches near Ypres. So up to this point the Corps History is correct, but we need to consider a couple of things. For the Field Squadrons this is a period of change and building up and development, going from a single Field Squadron and an Independent Field Troop to 3 field squadrons, which means that at times these units have been below strength while they each became established, on occasions even loaning complete Field Troops and equipment to allow the creation of the new unit. 13
More importantly the reason that you have this type of figure is not down to the number of people available but down to how a Field Engineering unit actually works:
A RE Field unit such as a Squadron or Company is a self contained unit that can be called on to carry out Field Engineering of a variety of forms and tasks, but to do this the unit has the Field Troops as the working or task delivery unit but anyone that has worked as a sapper or with sappers knows that engineering works consumes a significant amount of Engineering and Construction Resources.
So to keep the Field Troops supplied the Squadron has an Echelon – the In-Unit Quartermaster department that holds the big stores and equipment, and deals with demanding stores from Higher formation, either for specific tasks or as it’s own holdings are issued, expended or damaged. So the 1 officer and 54 members of a Field Squadron are not in the trenches, they are demanding stores and pushing the stores down to the Field Troops on the ground or in the Trenches. As a Echelon Commander friend of mine would regularly say “No War without G4!” and it is very true of the Great War, to deliver effect Sapper units consume engineering stores.
In addition the Echelon was providing a service to the wider Cavalry Division. All formations and units used horse drawn wagons, what happens when you have a damaged cart wheel, axle or body work of your horse drawn vehicle? Units would take it to the RE Field Squadron’s Echelon where the RE Tradesmen would carry out repairs – Wheelwrights, cart-wrights, carpenters and Blacksmiths. Right across all of the unit’s war diaries you will find the references to the repair work carried out to the Cavalry Division’s horse drawn vehicles, so the statement that “, and this left the remainder of the Squadron practically immobile and quite unproductive” is very much incorrect.
Also the Squadron HQ is not likely to be all in the trenches, the Command element may be in the trenches but the Administration element will be near but doing their job of administrating the unit particularly as it may have Field Troops with different Brigades and Divisions, and the orders from Division will need to come into a functioning HQ. So these guys are not realistically in the 70 troop numbers.
So that leaves the 4 x Field Troops. Now it is important to break down that number of 1+30 in each troop. A full strength Field Troop has 30 NCOs and men, this is made up of 23 Sappers (NCOs and Men) and 7 Drivers. The Drivers form the unit 1st line Transport and supply and it is likely that these men are not in the trenches on a permanent basis.
Why? The period that the RE Troops are in the trenches is usually between 14-30 days at a time, they are not rotating out in the same way the infantry are, these guys are working in the trenches for that full period. If they are working then they are consuming G4 Stores and they need regular resupply and that bringing forward of supplies falls to the 1st line transport and supply from the Field Troops. These guys are not sat on their arse back in the Echelon, they are bringing forward the equipment and stores ready for the next day/night of engineering tasks.
To that end with an upto strength unit you are looking at 92 NCOs and Sappers in the trenches but in the period of 1914/15 the Squardons are working working at 2 or 3 Troop strength and that is closer to the 70 figure.
Once the Cavalry Divisions are re-organised to create the Dismounted Cavalry Units for the Trenches in 1916 and 1917 what you find is that a Division can create a Dismounted Brigade – This is because a Cavalry Regiment is in man power terms half the strength of an Infantry Battalion. This is then matched by the Field Squadrons as they work on supplying a Dismounted Troop of 30 NCOs and Sappers to support a Brigade (also remember those cavalry regiments also have their Cavalry Pioneers – The RE Field Squadrons are still running these training courses and refresher courses to the Cavalry Units through out the war as well).
The last point I want to make about the 70 NCOs and Sappers that are working in the Trenches of 1914 and 1915, they are not ineffective or unproductive as the Chapter 16 Author suggests, when you read the War diaries of 1st and 2nd Field Squadrons during their time in the trenches, they are regularly supervising and managing working parties of between 700-1500 personnel which is not bad for a small unit, In my opinion that’s punching above your weight and delivering effect. But that isn’t by accident or simply being forced on the unit. This ability to manage large working parties was pointed out by Capt Cox14 as an essential skill of the Sappers and NCOs of the Field Troop, and the “Duty of Supervision” was highlighted as a requirement of the Field Troops by Sir Douglas Haig in his report on Cavalry Divisional Training of 1909.
In my view the 70 men of the Field Squadrons when dismounted and working in the trenches, are in the good old fashioned traditions of the Corps, a force multiplier and delivering a significant Engineering effect. I fully accept that they are a smaller capability compared to the 2 Field Companies (later increased to 3 Companies)in the Infantry Divisions but they are most definitely a productive and economical Sapper unit, and that 70 man dismounted unit was regularly producing Engineering Effect with Working parties of 1500 men.
OK, that’s the first of the rants over, time to catch my breath and get ready for the next one.
Notes and references:
1. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
2. Chapter 16, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume 5. (1952) Institution of Royal Engineers.
4. My view is that the Author has the view that the Squadrons would have been more productive and more mobile if mounted in lorries rather than on horse back. while the British Army at the time was embracing mechanisation more than the other armys, the all terrain capabilities of the lorry at the time was not great and the Lorry was viewed as an Logistic asset to be used at higher formation level – this will be a discussion post in the future. Also the Author does not understand the role and function of the Cavalry of the Great War. His view is that they were the “Shock of Impact” of charging horsemen, rather than the multi role capability designed to operate on the flanks, move rapidly to plug/ exploit gaps, carry out recce etc – again a topic that I will come back to in a separate blog post.
5. Colonel WH Evans DSO (1926) Brief History of the Royal Engineers with Cavalry in France During the War 1914-1918, RE Journal 1926. – this is a really good article split across 2 editions of the Journal in 1926, but it is as it suggests a brief history and while it gives some detailed info about Officers with the Squadrons it is a “Big Hand” overview. When you read this article and Chapter 16 you can see big chunks of the article lifted into the Chapter. The article gives a taste and should point you to specific areas of the war diaries.
6. Chapter 5, Section 156, Cavalry Training Manual (1915), General Staff, War Office.
7. Air raft Equipment, Section 7, Military Engineering Part 3B, Military Bridging. (1914), General Staff, War Office
8. Manual of Field Engineering (1911), General Staff, War Office.
9. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
10. War Diaries of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1st Indian & 2nd Indian Field Squadrons RE
11. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 12 – War Establishments of Various Units, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
12. Chapter 1, Page 9, Table 13 India -Cavalry Brigade, War Establishments, Field Service Pocket Book, (1914) General Staff, War Office.
13. Page 21, 25th Sep 1914, 1st Field Squadron War Diary, – 4 Field Troop and Equipment detached temporarily from 1 Field Squadron RE to help form 2nd Field Squadron, the Troop would return at the end of October 1914.
14. Capt EW Cox RE, (1913), Page 156, Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No 3 Senior Officers Class at the SME, RE Journal
Firstly I must give an apology for the lack of posts. however I have not been idle, there has been a lot of digging into archives and war diaries and planning for the coming spring and summer while I am here in Mons.
My last blog post focused on the blowing of bridges and crossings on the canals at Mons. In that post I highlighted the first Royal Engineer fatalities of the Great War – 2Lt HW Holt RE.
2Lt Holt RE was one of the Section Commanders (a Troop Commander in modern parlance) of 56 Field Company Royal Engineers. His Section was tasked to carry out the demolition of the bridge on the Rue Des Bragnons over the Mons Canal. This crossing connected the villages of Nimy (south side of Canal) with the village of Maisieres (North side of the Canal). 56 Fd Coy RE had the problem that they were ordered to not start the demolition work on the crossings until 0600hrs on the 23rd of August, despite being in location on the 22nd August. The Company was further hindered by the limited amount of explosives that they had in their possession.
By the time the Sections of the Field Company started their work to prepare the crossings for demolition it was clear that the German Army was a lot closer that anyone expected and the eastern crossing at Obourg were actively under fire from Germans on the high ground above the crossings.
At the Rue Des Bragnons crossing 2Lt Holt and his men had started their task to install the explosives on the bridge. At this time German troops had infiltrated into the village of Maisieres, and once they had suitable number they rushed the bridge and attacked the sappers as they worked. In the melee 2Lt Holt was shot and killed and 21 NCOs and Sappers were captured.
It is interesting to note that the 56 Field Coy RE War diary states that “Lt Holt believed to be wounded”.
I also feel it is important to clarify something that often causes confusion when looking at war documents such as War Diaries, when the term casualties are used it is not just deaths, it cover a number of categories:
Dead
Wounded
Captured
Missing
There is no other indication of other wounded or killed from 56 Fd Coy RE at the time.
To the best of my knowledge Lt AF Day RE of 57 Fd Coy RE is the second Royal Engineer fatality of the Great War, he received a head injury while attempting to get onto the Nimy Railway bridge to place charges. He would wait to the rear of the bridge in the vain hope that there would be a gap in the fighting that would allow him to get back onto the bridge unfortunately he would later die of his wounds while still waiting to get back onto the bridge. Again there are no other deaths listed in the 57 Fd Coy RE War Diary for the 23 Aug 1914.
So we have 2 RE Officers listed as being wounded and killed, the thing that is interested there are 2 other Sappers that are in the Military Cemetery at St Symphorien (East side of Mons) that died on the 23 Aug 1914. It is possible that these Sappers – Spr F Johnson RE and Spr H Rodford RE may be from 59 Fd Coy RE as they list “3 sappers lost wounded”. The use of the word “lost” in the war diary would indicate that they were left behind as the unit withdrew under fire and as such it is possible that two of them died of their wounds.
Coming back to Lt Holt RE, as stated, he was killed at the bridge at Maisieres and along with the infantry that were killed in the Nimy area it appears that they were initially buried in the village of Maisieres. There is a stone plaque at the village church, St Martins, that commemorates this fact.
Plaque on the side of St Martins Church, Maisieres
St Martins Church, Maisieres.
In 1916, The German Army decided that they wanted to create a centralised Military Cemetery for the area and with the agreement of a local Belgian Landowner, Jean De Lehaie, who provided the land at no cost on the proviso that the land would be used for the dead of both sides and “were commemorated with honour”. On 6 September 1917 the cemetery was formally opened by senior German Officers and several local Belgian Dignitaries, The German also placed a large obelisk on the high ground of the site to commemorate the dead buried in the cemetery.
After the Great War, the responsibilities for the Cemetery passed to the British and the Imperial War Graves Commission. As part of this process the British/ Imperial dead had their wooden crosses replaced with headstones, The British also added the Cross of Remembrance . Also between 1924 and 1952 efforts were made to bring in the dead from many of the local grave sites. it is during this period that I believe that 2Lt Holt’s body was moved from Maisieres.
With the lack of details of other casualties/ fatalities listed in 56 & 57 Fd Coy RE War Diaries I can only surmise that Johnson and Rodford may well be 2 of the wounded that were lost from 59 Fld Coy RE. The other Sapper units involved in the fight at the Mons Canal on 23/24 Aug 1914 were 17 Field Company RE who appear to only have one death – Cpl Marsden, killed at the Ghislain Railway Bridge, and 2&3 Field Troops of the Field Squadron RE who state no losses or wounded. (However the 17 Fd Coy RE War diary does not start until 27 August 1914).
The St Symphorien Cemetery has two other Sappers buried there, one is unknown and the other is from 1919.
I have still to locate where Lt AF Day RE and Cpl Marsden RE are buried, but that may well be a good excuse to get out for a few more local walks. As part of the research for this post I’ve come across the main CWGC cemeteries but I’ve also found it has been worth looking in some of the smaller village cemeteries as there are often the odd one or two military graves in them.
So there you have a bit of a follow up post on my previous blog post. With the weather starting to get better my aim is not to get out and start looking at some of the other battle sites from a Sapper perspective.
Having now arrived and settled into Mons, it has been a case of get out and look at the Great War History on my doorstep and it is pretty much on my door step.
There is a lot about the first and last shots of the war, and also the defence of the Canal and all of the actions that come with that – From a Sapper point of view the winning of 2 VCs for the actions on the 23 Aug is a big deal. But there is more to this, a lot more in fact and it also involves the Mounted Sappers of the Field Sqn RE.
Depending on what book you look at or who you talk to there are between 18-22 “bridges” across the canals that formed the BEF line of defence on the 23-24 Aug 1914.
Why the difference in numbers?
The canal had road bridges, rail bridges, foot bridges, locks, locks with bridges and some double bridges (bridges over the canal and directly linked a second bridge over a smaller drainage canal/ channel on the south side). With reference the locks not all were classed as a crossing -even though it would be possible for men on foot to cross. So you can see that there is a whole range of Structures that cross the Canals and offer a means of access from one side to the other.
I will look at what happened to them and who had responsibilities for them. I’ll go through the actions at the bridges moving East to west as that generally matches the the actions with the enemy as they approached the canal line.
Points to note
One of the points that is clear from reading the accounts, the war diaries and also some of the reference books is that there is not enough explosives held by the Sapper Field units for the task at hand, that becomes very clear as soon as the various units see the task at hand.
A Field Company RE would have 560 Slabs of wet Gun Cotton (1 lb each) and 720 primers (1 oz dry gun cotton packages)
The Field Sqn RE would be better provided for with 1120 Slabs of wet Gun Cotton (1 lb each) and 1920 primers (1 oz dry gun cotton packages),
It is also noted that while the Officers and Sappers of the units know demolitions and have been trained in it, they are not well practised in it. This is pointed out by Lt Gen Buckland in his 1932 article for the RE Journal and Capt EW Cox RE’s lecture to the Senior Officers Course at the SME, Chatham and recorded in the RE Journal Sep 1913. Cox points out that during the pre war exercises of 1911 the Field Troops are well practised in Water Supply and River Crossings, the demolition tasks tended to be cutting railway lines rather than bridge demolitions but are not close to be experts n the task.
Cox also pointed out that the quantity of explosives held by the Field Troops was too little and that there was no first line resupply – it would be interesting to know if his recommendation of a 100% resupply of demolition stores be carried with the Artillery Battery ammunition supply in each Brigade was ever taken up.
Another thing to note is that the view of the French Commander, General Joffre, was that this was going to be an “offensive” operation and as such no demolition plan was developed by either the British or the French in the event that they may have to withdraw, this failing cause a lot of problems for the BEF as it retreated from Mons back into France.
The last point to note is that in Horsfall & Cave’s book “Mons 1914” they state that just prior to the outbreak of war that a fault is identified with the in-service Instantaneous Fuse and it is withdrawn from service and only limited replacements items were available. As such the RE Field units had to rely on the Electric Exploder equipment of which there was only one per Field Section (remember this is a 40 man troop in modern parlance) and per Field Troop, and Safety Fuse. I have to state none of the other references mention this, I had hoped that the RE History Volume 5 may mention it but it doesn’t, but bearing in mind it was written in 1953 from war diaries, notes and memories, it doesn’t surprise me, but to support this every reference talks about the exploder and safety fuse and no mention of instantaneous fuse. it’s not mentioned in the war diaries as the equipment recall occurred just prior to the declaration of war, which is the marker for the start of unit war diaries.
3 Division’s Area – Obourg, Nimy, Jemappes and Mariette.
The Canal area that covered Mons (the Eastern and Northern side)was covered by units of 3 Div, this was also the responsibility of the 2 Field Companys Royal Engineers of that Division:
56 Field Company Royal Engineers
57 Field Company Royal Engineers.
56 Field Company RE covered the Eastern Crossings from Obourg round to Nimy. When given the task the OC of 56 Fld Coy RE he carried out a recce of the crossings and quickly identified that he did not have nearly enough explosives to deal with the types of crossing points. He dispatched men into Mons to try and get more explosives either from Military or civilian sources. He was also told that he was not to start any demolition work until 0630hrs on the 23 Aug 14.
Unfortunately by the time that 56 Field Company sappers move upto the crossings and bridges the Germans were already pressing down on the 3 crossings in the Obourg area.
*A Personal Take – while it could be said that the crossings could have been prepared with the unit holdings of explosives there were a number of factors that should be considered.
All of the crossings are substantial items of engineering and would need a significant quantity of explosives.
The limited availability of Fuse Instantaneous and the numbers of electrical exploders made the task difficult.
The time at which 56th Fld Coy were tasked was late and the Germans were already pressing down so that the demolitions would need to be “hasty” demolition tasks rather than “deliberate” and as such they would require significantly more explosives to achieve the required effect. (According to the Field engineering manual 1911, hasty demolitions should add a factor of 50% onto all calculated explosives)
The crossings that 56 Fld Coy RE had to deal with in the 4th Middlesex area were:
Lock No 4
Road Bridge to Obourg, next to the Railway station.
Road bridge at Obourg Station.
Lock No 5
In some cases the locks on the Canal do have a bridges incorporated, but for some they do not but can still provide a crossing point for infantry when they are in the closed position.
Due to the weight of fire from the Germans on the eastern bank and the high ground it was not possible to prepare any these crossings for demolition and all of the crossings were captured intact.
Moving up into the 9th Brigade area at Nimy there were a further 4 crossing points that were also the responsibility of 56 Fld Coy RE.
The Bridge on the Rue Des Bragnons. This Connected the villages of Nimy and Maisieres. This was a lifting bridge with the lifting gear on the Maisieres side (Northern Bank/Enemy side).
Swing Road Bridge at Nimy
Nimy Railway Bridge. This was a metal construction bridge.
Lt Holt RE and his Section (a Troop in modern parlance) were attempting to install demolitions onto the Rue Des Bragnons Bridge when the Germans rushed the bridge. Lt Holt was shot and injured and his section was captured. Lt Holt soon died of his wounds and has the unfortunate claim to fame of being the first Royal Engineer to be killed in the Great War.
The next 2 bridges (The Swing Bridge and the Railway Bridge) were the responsibility of Lt AF Day RE and his section. Lt Day did not have enough explosive to destroy both bridges. The swing bridge had been rotated open and secured on the South Bank (Nimy) and the metal railway bridge was being defended by Machine Guns of the 4th Royal Fusiliers.
Lt Dease & Pte Godley of the 4th Middlesex defend the railway bridge, Dease would die of his wounds, both were awarded the VC.
Both bridges were under heavy enemy fire and Lt Day took cover with the hope that the opportunity may present itself to allow him and his sappers to get onto the railway bridge to install the demolition charges. Unfortunately there were no opportunities and Lt Day was wounded and soon after was captured once the Germans crossed the bridges.
The Germans captured both of these bridges intact.
The last of the crossing points in the 56 Fld Coy RE area was Lock No 6, having read several accounts there is no suggestion that this lock had any form of bridge, so the assumption is that this was just a lock and would have been simply opened with the mechanism either locked or damaged to prevent closing.
The next series of crossings were allocated to 57 Fld Coy RE.
The Ghlin Road bridge (1000 yards west of lock No 6)
Railway Bridge (500 yards west of the Ghlin Bridge)
Both of these bridges were the responsibility of Cpl A Payne and 6 sappers. On both of the bridges charges were laid but due to not having an electric exploder they would both require to be initiated using Safety Fuse. This created its own particular challenge as it required the bridges to be initiated with equal lengths of safety fuse. Despite this challenge Cpl Payne and his sappers successfully destroyed both bridges. (Note- the reason why the safety fuse needed to be of an equal length is that if one side detonates before the other side there is a chance that the blast would shift or blow the other charges off the structure before they detonated, the result would mean a partial demolition)
Moving on into the next battalion area – 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, this is the start of the Conde Canal and the Battalion had a 2000 yard frontage of canal to defend. This was still 57 Fld Coy RE area of responsibility.
The Crossings are:
Lock No 1
Lifting Road Bridge at the Gas Poste
Lock No 2, this has a bridge crossing as part of it’s construction.
Lifting Road Bridge at Jemappes
the Lifting Road Bridge at Jemappes in the open position
Lifting Road bridge at Jemappes in the closed position
Lock No 1 had no bridge and as such it was opened and fixed in position.
the Gas Poste lifting road bridge was prepared for dems by Lt Boulnois RE and Sgt Smith and successfully blown using the Section’s Electric exploder. With this bridge destroyed, Lt Boulnois and Sgt Smith dashed onto deal with the other bridges.
Lock No2 was being dealt with by LCpl Jarvis and his sappers and some of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, at this time they were under fire and Cpl Jarvis ordered his men to get back while he finished fixing the charges, working from a row boat he was assisted by Private Heron of the RSF. Despite the enemy fire the charges were set and Jarvis completed the demolition. For this action under fire he was awarded the Victoria cross and Heron was awarded the DCM.
An artists impression of Jarvis fixing charges on the Lock no 2 bridge but it seems to have omitted Private Heron who was working the boat for Jarvis.
while this was going on the 3 Div CRE’s adjutant – Capt Wright RE was helping the sappers by moving stores and explosives using his motor car, having met with Lt Boulnois and Sgt Smith after they had blown the lifting bridge they made a decision that Sgt Smith would take the Electric Exploder and a drum of cable and go with Capt Wright to deal with the Lifting bridge at Mariette in the next battalions area, while Lt Boulnois would head to the Lifting Road Bridge at Jemappes.
The Jemappes bridge had been prepared by Cpl Halewood and his sappers, the limited availability of the electric exploders meant that Sapper ingenuity had come into play. several of the houses in Jemappes near to the canal had an electricity supply and between Cpl Halewood and Lt Boulnois it was worked out that they could wire the demolitions into the lighting circuit of one of the houses and by quickly flicking on the light they could provide a suitable power source to set off the explosives. As the last British troops crossed back over the bridge under German fire Lt Boulnois flicked the switch at the very moment that the power to the village failed. The bridge could not be blown and The Sapper dems team had to withdraw with the infantry.
The last bridge in the 3 Division area was in the Northumberland Fusiliers area
Lifting Road bridge at Mariette.
This was a double bridge as at various sections along the south side of the canal there was a deep drainage channel. The canal bridge was 60′ wide with the lifting mechanism on the northern bank, and the bridge over the drainage channel was 20′. The canal bridge had been prepared for demolition with the electrical wires on the tow path.
below is a sketch map taken from the Northumberland Gunner Website showing the layout of the Northumberland Fusiliers in Mariette and the position of the bridge, tow path and the drainage channel.
The bridge was under heavy fire and it was necessary to connect the cables on the tow path with the cables, that Sgt Smith had brought with him, to the electric exploder. To do so would mean being exposed to enemy fire, so Capt Wright attempted to cross the drainage channel bridge from underneath by going hand over hand from the girders. unfortunately a head wound sustained earlier when he was near LCpl Jarvis’s demolition site had severely weakened him and after several attempts he fell into the drainage channel and had to be rescued by Sgt Smith. Unfortunately the bridge couldn’t be blown and Smith and Wright were forced to withdraw with B Company of the Northumberland Fusiliers. Wright would receive the VC for his efforts on this day.
An Artist’s take on Capt Wright trying to connect the wires to the charges – Clearly the artist was more familiar with English canal bridges than those on the Mons-Conde Canal.
Another Artists impression of Capt Wright’s efforts, but equally created with a bit of poetic licence.
5 Division’s Area – St Ghislain, Les Herbieres, and Pommeroeul
This Division area was the responsibility of the Division’s 2 Field Companies:
17 Field Company RE
59 Field Company RE
The first section of the Canal in the 5 Div area was a 3000 yard stretch that was the responsibility of 1st Bn Queens own Royal West Kents. This section covered the small town of St Ghislain and had 3 Bridges, these were the responsibility of 17 field Company RE
Fixed Iron Railway bridge
Bridge at Lock No 3
Lifting Road bridge
The 3 bridges in this area had been well prepared for demolition but they were finished while under direct fire, but by the evening all charges were secured and the cables running back to a well placed firing position However but the railway bridge came under shell fire and some of the gun cotton charges were blown off from the beams and girders. Cpl Marsden attempted to fix them back in place but was killed before he could finish the task. 2nd Lt Godsell and Sgt Payne detonate the demolition with the electrical exploder and the bridge is successfully blown.
The bridge at Lock 3 is blown by Cpl Gerachty and the heavy iron lifting road bridge is successfully blown by Cpl Taylor.
the next section of canal is a 1000 yard frontage and manned by the 2nd Bn KOSB, this has one bridge at Les Herbieres.
Iron Road bridge at Lock No 4
this bridge is prepared for demolition by Lt Pottinger and his section of 17 Field Company RE. The order to blow the bridge is given and the Electrical Exploder fails to function. after several attempts it is realised that the exploder has a fault inside and it isn’t possible to now attach safety fuse. However this doesn’t stop Lt Pottinger attempting to shoot that the detonators with his webley in the hope that that may set of the explosives. this wasn’t an act of desperation as such, as Lt Pottinger was an Army champion shot with the revolver. Unfortunately his efforts came to naught and the bridge had to be left intact while the Sappers and Infantry withdrew under fire.
17 Field company RE also sank an number of canal barges, using 1 lbs of gun cotton at the keel, to prevent them being used as improvised crossings.
The next section of canal was in the responsibility of 1st Bn East Surrey Regt of 14 Brigade and the bridges were the responsibility of 59 Field Company RE. there was 2 bridges in the Surrey’s area and these were the responsibility of 1 Section under the command of Lt Pennycuick RE
Fixed Railway bridge (Plate Girder construction)
Double Road Bridge – a Fixed bridge over a drainage channel and a lift bridge over the Canal, known as the Pont D’Hautrage
Both of these bridges were successfully blown, from all of the references and articles there is no mention on how these were detonated or whether they were under fire.
The final section of the 5 Div area was defended by the 1st Bn Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. There were 2 bridges on this section of the Canal and they were the responsibility of Lt Flint and No3 section of 59 Field Company RE.
Lifting Bridge on the Pommeroeul to Thulin Road
Wooden Bridge at Lock No 5.
While these bridges were being prepared for demolition the CO of 1 DCLI voiced concern that his battalion may end up being stuck as there was a small river that ran parallel with the canal, approximately 600 yards to the south. To lessen the risk a section from 59 Field Company RE build a pontoon bridge to provide a crossing for the Battalion.
The problem that Lt Flint and his sappers had was that their bridges were under direct fire from a German Field Gun situated a mile to the north of them. despite this, both Bridges were successfully blown. The Pontoon Bridge provided a key lifeline for the DCLI but unfortunately it could not be stripped out as time did not allow and had to be destroyed to deny the Germans a crossing point.
19 Brigade Area – Pommeroeul to Conde
The area west of Lock No 5 across to Conde was initially covered by the regiments of the Cavalry Brigades, they had pushed forward and the Brigades were supported by 2 & 3 Field Troop RE of the Field Squadron RE (Note – it was not numbered at this point as it was the only RE Field Squadron, it would be another 2 weeks until 2nd Field Squadron was created and at that point it would take on the number of 1st Fd Sqn RE)
the cavalry would be relieved by Infantry of 19 Brigade at about 1530hrs on the 23 Aug, this would allow more of them to push forward to recce and to engage the Germans. The Field Troops had responsibility for 5 Bridges which they had been preparing for demolition for most of the afternoon. 3 of the bridges were to the south of Pommeroeul and the other 2 were further west at the village of St Aybert.
Pommeroeul –
A Lift Bridge over the Canal
slightly west of the above bridge – A metal Lift Bridge over the Canal
Wooden bridge over the river just to the south of the above bridge
St Aybert –
A Lift bridge at the east end of the village
A Girder Bridge in the middle of the village
by 1530hrs B Company 1st Middlesex Regt had moved up to the Canal and were now in place and supporting the RE Troops working at the bridges.By 1630hrs the Bridges were under heavy fire from the Germans of 8 Division. The eastern bridge is not destroyed until British cavalry units have returned over it and it is blown at 1715hrs with the other 2 Pommeroeul bridges destroyed shortly after.
The bridges at St Ayberts are held for longer to allow the 6th Dragoons Guards to withdraw over the Canal. The last of the 6 DG cross the Bridges at about 0230hrs on the 24th Aug and the Field Troop blows both bridges at 0300hrs. Both Field Troops withdrew back to the Sqn HQ at Quievrain and would then start the Retreat.
The current Girder Bridge at the same spot of the Girder bridge destroyed at 0300hrs 24 Aug 1914 by one of the RE Field Troops
Conclusion
This has been an interesting project to dig into, particularly as it has such an important part played by 2 Mounted Sapper Units, of which I’ll do a bit more of a detailed posting. As for the other units it is interesting to see that there is a real mixed bag of results.
That isn’t a criticism, every unit was carrying out demolitions while under fire, with not enough explosives, limited electric exploders and next to no instantaneous fuse. Add to that the order for 56 Field Company RE not start preparing Demolitions until 0630hrs on the 23rd Aug – a whole night lost, and then the enemy were were on top of you before you start!
I’ve tried to get as many old photos of the bridges as I can, and when you look at the range of bridge type, construction and materials it is clear that that the Sappers worked bloody miracles with the resources and time available to blow as many bridges as they did. There has been a real mix of bravery and madness to be found as you move from each bridge and lock.
Hopefully I’ve managed to add a bit more to the Battle of Mons than the usual stories of the first shots of the Great War and winning of the first VCs of the war (not to take anything away from those stories) but I wanted to look at a very sapper aspect of the battle.
References:
RE Field Sqn War Diary 22 Aug 1914 – 1 Sep 1914
59 Field Coy RE, War Diary, 22 Aug 1914- 1 sep 1914
Capt EW Cox RE “Field Troops – A lecture delivered to No3 Senior Officers’ Class, SME” The Royal Engineers Journal, September 1913
Maj Gen Sir Reginald Buckland “Demolitions Carried Out at Mons and during the retreat, 1914”, The Royal Engineers Journal, March 1932
2Lt KB Godsell RE (17 Fld Coy RE) “The First Month of World War 1 – extract of Personal notes jotted down by the wayside”, The Royal Engineers Journal, March 1974
Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave ” Mons 1914″, Pen and Sword Publishing, 2000
David Lomas, ” Mons 1914, The BEF’s Tactical Triumph” Campaign Series, Osprey Publishing, 8th Impression 2008
Jon Cooksey & Jerry Murland ” The Retreat from Mons 1914: North, Casteau to Le Cateau”, Battle Lines Series, Pen and Sword Publishing, 2014
Andrew Rawson, “British Expeditionary Force, The 1914 Campaign”, Pen and Sword Publishing, 2014
“The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers Volume 5, The Home front, France, Flanders and Italy in the First World War”, Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952.
“The Royal Engineers Field Service Pocket Book” Third Edition, The Royal Engineers Institution, 1916
General Staff, War Office, “Manual of Field Engineering, 1911” HMSO, Reprint 1914
General Staff, War Office, “Field Service Regulations Part 1, Operations, 1909”, HMSO, Reprint 1914
General Staff, War Office, “Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training Parts 1 and 2, 1912” HMSO, Reprint 1914
General Staff, War Office, “Field Service pocket Book, 1914 with Amendments 1916”, HMSO, 1917
I’m down to a month until I move to my new job in Belguim and the accommodation that I’ve been allocated puts me right next to so much of the history of August 1914.
So what is the plan? While I will be coming back to the Estate on a regular basis, one of the first plans is to look at what the movements and the routes were of the RE Field Sqn of the Cavalry Division.
The Squadron had responsibility for 3 bridges over the Canal to the west of Mons, which were blown. for the next few days they then moved back with the Cavalry eventually ended up south of Le Cateau before reforming with the Cavalry Division.
A lot of the work they had been tasked with during the retreat was Demolitions, creating Cavalry tracks to improve mobility and also fortifing villages to provide defensive positions for rear guard units to hold back. delay the advancing Germans.
It is going to beinteresting to see, using the war diaries as the guide, what the distances that were covered and also the route.
Rest asured there will be photos and also a post showing what I find on the route.
As many of you know I am a Garrison Engineer (Construction), which is basically a commissioned Clerk of Works (Construction). But what is the origin of the Garrison Engineer?
The general practise of the 1700s and early 1800s was to keep a small standing army and to increase the army’s size in times of war. Most of these troops would be billeted with the local population and then demobilised after the war. After Waterloo the army was reduced back down but was bigger than it had been prior to the peninsular war. The intention was that with this force they would build some barracks to accommodate the soldiers and therefore reduce the burden on the local population. The construction of these barracks was mainly put out to civilian contract.
In 1828 the Barracks question was raised in Parliament by Sir Henry Hardinge, the Clerk of the Ordinance who stated that he was not of the opinion that it was economical to employ Civil Architects rather than Military Engineers.
He considered that the construction and maintenance of barracks could be carried out more economically by Officers of the Royal Engineers than by any system of Civil Architects and (civilian) Clerk of Works.
The Royal Engineers were then tasked to build and supervise the construction of barracks across Britain. A system of District Engineers (Lt Colonels and Majors) was established and the view was that Engineer Officers that were stationed in Britain in RE battalions and companies should be tasked to work for the District Engineer, the view taken was that this would be an excellent opportunity for the Engineering Officer to learn the skills they would need on operations/ campaign when sent overseas.
The District Engineers would be assisted by Sapper Draughtsman and Engineer Clerks, later they would also be assisted by Military Foreman of Works (the forerunner to the Clerks of Works (construction) – The first course started in 1839 I believe, I aim to research into that a bit more).
An example of the type of work undertaken is that of the construction of Fulwood Barracks at Preston, this was designed and managed by the Royal Engineers using the District Engineer organisation. The Building works were commenced in July, 1842, and the first stone was laid on the 28th of August, 1843, and being completed by 1848. The entire cost was 137,921 pounds, 2 shillings and 10 pence. During my time at Fulwood it was always pointed out that the build was delivered on time but went £100 over budget. (by modern standards a 0.07% overspend seems a bit of a bargain to be honest!)
Fulwood Barracks main entrance
As we move forward it was felt that there was a need to increase the assistance to the District Engineers, which by the 1880’s were being referred to as the as CRE’s (Commander Royal Engineers) as they had command over the RE units in their districts.. A Royal Engineer review of 1885 made a recommendation to create and an additional 8 Quartermasters for the Corps of Royal Engineers.
At this point in time there was only 6 Quartermasters in the Royal Engineers, the additional 8 Quartermasters would see 2 become added to the existing Quartermasters while the other 6 would be promoted from Military Foreman of Works who were Warrant Officers. The selected Warrant Officers became “Quartermasters of Works Services” and they would be allocated to Districts to assist the CRE and Division Officers in the construction and maintenance of Barracks and Garrisons.
Quartermasters at this time were given honorary rank of Lieutenant on first appointment and then promoted Captain after 10 years of service, promotion to Major was by selection. A Quartermaster was required to retire at age 55.
After that first initial 6 Quartermaster of Work Services in 1885 they were increased in number to 49 by 1914.
While I still have more digging to do to see what the expansion was for the Quartermasters of Works Services and Military Foremen of Works was during the Great War.
The next part of the research is to understand how and when the QM of Works Services progressed onto become the Garrison Engineer. I have some articles and information that show Garrison Engineer appointments existed in India as part of the Military Engineering Services and also in the Salonika Campaign but these posts were for Senior RE Officers (Majors or Lt Colonels) or Senior Civilian Engineers. So more research needed and I have a feeling this is going to require looking in lots of RE Journal articles and perhaps contacting the Indian Army Sappers.
